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Unwisely unlamented, the corporate form now languishes, bleed-
ing and dying, nearly done in by self-styled do-gooders.1
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 1993, Montana joined the ranks of approxi-
mately thirty2 other states authorizing limited liability companies.,
Legislatures typically authorize the use of limited liability compa-
nies to provide small business with the best of both worlds from
the corporate and partnership forms of business entities.' Limited
1. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1.01, at 1-1 (1993). In his
tongue-in-cheek eulogy for corporations, Presser laments how the tax law and recent devel-
opments in corporate law threaten the advantages of limited liability enjoyed by corpora-
tions. Perhaps a bigger threat to the continued use of the corporate form by closely-held
businesses is not so much the "self-styled do-gooders," but the relative advantages afforded
by limited liability companies.
2. Shop Talk: Tax Trap for Professionals Forming LLCs, 79 J. TAX'N 63 (1993).
3. The legislature enacted the Montana Limited Liability Company Act with no dis-
senting votes in the Senate and only eight dissenting votes in the House of Representatives.
MONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HISTORY AND FINAL STATUS OF BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS OF
THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF MONTANA FIFTY-THIRD LEGIS-
LATURE, S.B. 146, at 66-67 (1993). The Act's principal sponsor was Senator Mignon
Waterman.
In 1991, Billings attorney Jim Sites, then Chair of the Tax, Probate and Business Law
Section of the State Bar of Montana, created a Limited Liability Company Subcommittee
to study the progress of limited liability companies on the national level and to propose
appropriate limited liability company legislation for Montana. The subcommittee was com-
prised of a bipartisan, diverse body of attorneys, which included private practitioners, mem-
bers of state government and academia, as well as a law student associate member who
reviewed limited liability company statutes of other jurisdictions. Committee members in-
cluded Professor Steven C. Bahls, Chair and Reporter; Julieann McGarry, Co-reporter;
Richard M. Baskett; Garth B. Jacobson; Alan L. Joscelyn; and Thomas C. Morrison.
The subcommittee studied limited liability company legislation from the seventeen
states that had then authorized limited liability companies. Those states included Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The subcom-
mittee also studied various drafts of the Prototype Limited Liability Company Act [herein-
after ABA Prototype Act] promulgated by the American Bar Association Subcommittee on
Limited Liability Companies of the Section of Business Law. The subcommittee ultimately
based its proposal on the July 1992 version of the ABA Prototype Act.
4. For excellent general discussions of limited liability companies, see Thomas E. Geu,
Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Pt. 2), 37
S.D. L. REV. 467 (1992); Thomas E. Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A
Basic Comparative Primer (Pt. 1), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44 (1992) [hereinafter Liability Pt. 1];
Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging En-
tity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375 (1992); Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited
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liability companies uniquely integrate the limited liability attrib-
utes of a corporation with the "pass-through" tax advantages en-
joyed by a partnership. An evolutionary entity, a limited liability
company provides significant advantages for today's closely held
business. This new business form promises simplicity in formation,
flexibility in planning and operation, limited liability, member con-
trol of the business, and significant tax advantages when compared
with corporations.'
In the face of almost uniform praise for limited liability com-
panies, this Article will sound a few notes of caution. One concern
about use of limited liability companies is that courts, legislatures,
and regulatory agencies have not answered all of the questions
about limited liability companies.6 One unanswered question is
whether common law doctrines applicable to corporations are ap-
plicable to limited liability companies. The corporate doctrines ap-
plicable to limited liability companies might include the corporate
trust fund doctrine, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, the
business judgment rule, and the doctrines governing oppression of
minority shareholders. Determination of whether corporate doc-
trines apply, or whether corresponding (but different) doctrines in
partnership law apply, is difficult because limited liability compa-
nies share some attributes of corporations and some attributes of
partnerships. The problem is compounded because most states
have neither codified nor, by statute, rejected these common law
doctrines for limited liability companies. This Article examines the
public policy reasons behind these common law corporate doc-
trines and concludes that many, but not all, of the corporate doc-
trines should apply in some form to limited liability companies.
Often, however, because of the unique attributes of limited liabil-
ity companies, courts should revise the corporate doctrines when
applying them to limited liability companies.
This Article first examines the history of limited liability com-
panies and why the fundamental attributes of limited liability
companies make them attractive for small businesses.7 The Article
next analyzes whether those fundamental attributes justify appli-
cation of the common law doctrines that protect creditors from in-
appropriate corporate conduct." The Article concludes with a dis-
Liability Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 (1991); Susan P. Hamill, The Limited
Liability Company: A Possible Choice for Doing Business?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 721 (1989).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 30-65.
6. See generally Gazur & Goff, supra note 4, at 462-69.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 30-65.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 66-142.
1994]
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cussion of whether the corporate common law doctrines governing
the duties of owners and managers ought to apply to limited liabil-
ity companies.9
II. ATTRIBUTES OF CLOSELY OWNED BUSINESSES OPERATING AS
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
The attributes of limited liability companies make them an
appropriate form for many business organizations currently oper-
ating as partnerships or close corporations. In order to understand
why limited liability companies are so attractive for closely held
businesses, it is desirable to examine both the history of limited
liability companies and why neither partnerships nor corporations
have historically fully satisfied the needs of small businesses.
A. History of Limited Liability Companies
The concept of limited liability companies originated in Ger-
many more than one hundred years ago. In 1892, Germany author-
ized creation of a business form similar to limited liability compa-
nies called "Gesellschaft mit beschrinkter Haftung (GmbH)." 10
Within ten years, Portugal authorized an organization with the at-
tributes of limited liability corporations called "sociedad de re-
sponsabilidad limitada."'1 Today limited liability company-type
organizations are common throughout Europe and Latin
America."2
Recent developments in federal tax law persuaded state legis-
latures to enact limited liability company legislation. In 1986, fed-
eral tax legislation repealed the General Utilities exception for
gains realized from certain sales of corporate assets. 3 The same
legislation reinforced the double taxation of corporations and
shareholders. 14 Likewise, the inversion of the corporation and indi-
9. The three primary doctrines involving corporate common law duties analyzed in
this Article are the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the duty to avoid oppression of
minority owners. See infra text accompanying notes 143-272.
10. See WOLFGANG G. FRIEDMANN & GEORGE KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL Busi-
NESS VENTURES 214, 216-17 (1961); WILLIAM D. BAGLEY & PHILIP P. WHYNOr, THE LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY: THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE 1.502-.503 (1991).
11. Id.
12. FRIEDMANN & KALMANOFF, supra note 10.
13. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified in amendments at various
places in 26 U.S.C.). See generally Sheldon M. Bonovitz, Impact of the TRA Repeal of
General Utilities, 65 J. TAX'N 388 (1986); Eric M. Zolt, The General Utilities Doctrine:
Examining the Scope of the Repeal, 65 TAXES 819 (1987).
14. See generally Craig W. Friedrich, The Unincorporation of America, 14 J. CORP.
TAX'N 3 (1987); Eric M. Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A
State of Disequilibrium, 66 N.C. L. REV. 839 (1988). Congress reinforced the double taxation
[Vol. 55
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vidual tax rates further compounded problems for businesses taxed
as corporations.13  i
Before 1986, only two states, Wyoming and Florida, had en-
acted limited liability legislation, probably because much doubt ex-
isted as to whether limited liability companies would receive the
benefit of taxation as partnerships. '" In 1988, the Internal Revenue
Service provided needed clarification by releasing Revenue Ruling
88-76,17 which stated that properly structured Wyoming limited li-
ability companies would be taxed as partnerships. This Revenue
Ruling settled many doubts about the future of limited liability
companies and broke the way for other states to begin legislation
in this area. Since then, the Internal Revenue Service has issued
favorable rulings for Colorado, 8 Virginia, 19 Nevada,'20 Florida,21 Il-
linois," and West Virginia."
State legislatures have been quick to jump on the limited lia-
bility company band wagon in order to provide the owners of small
businesses organized in their states with limited liability and the
benefits of taxation as partnerships." To provide states with guid-
of corporations and shareholders in several ways: The legislation strengthened the corporate
alternative minimum tax, set the maximum corporate tax rate higher than the maximum
individual tax rate, and eliminated the rate preference for capital gains.
15. See Zolt, supra note 14, at 858-63.
16. Gazur & Goff, supra note 4, at 389-91.
17. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. In the same year the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) announced it had determined that the attribute of limited liability alone does not
preclude taxation as a partnership. See Announcement 88-118, 1988-38 I.R.B. (Sept. 19,
1988).
18. Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-3 C.B. 8.
19. Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-3 C.B. 6.
20. Rev. Rul. 93-30, 1993-16 C.B. 4.
21. Rev. Rul. 93-53, 1993-26 C.B. 7.
22. Rev. Rul. 93-49, 1993-25 C.B. 11.
23. Rev. Rul. 93-50, 1993-25 C.B. 13. The IRS is reviewing the Montana Limited Lia-
bility Company Act for a possible revenue ruling.
24. See, supra note 2. The Montana Limited Liability Company Act is just one of a
series of recent enactments by the Montana Legislature to improve the business organiza-
tion governance statutes for small enterprises. In fact, Montana has been a leader in adopt-
ing modern business governance laws. Adopted by the 1987 Legislature, the Montana Close
Corporation Act allows corporations with fewer than 25 shareholders to become Montana
statutory close corporations. The law makes it easier to keep control of a Montana statutory
close corporation within the family (or within the original control group) and requires less
formality. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-101 to -504 (1993); see also Steven C. Bahls &
Marcelle Compton Quist, The A.B.A. Model Statutory Close Corporation Act: A New Op-
portunity for 'Made in Montana Corporations,' 49 MONT. L. REv. 66 (1988). In 1991, the
Montana Legislature restated both the Montana Business Corporation Act and the Mon-
tana Nonprofit Corporation Act, in part, to clarify ambiguities in the previous acts and to
accommodate the needs of modern small businesses and nonprofit enterprises. See MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-112 to -1312, 35-2-113 to -1402 (1993); see also Steven C. Bahls, Mon-
tana's New Business Corporation Act: Duties, Dissension, Derivative Actions and Dissolu-
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ance, an American Bar Association subcommittee drafted a Proto-
type Limited Liability Company Act (ABA Prototype Act).25 Ar-
kansas, Idaho, and Montana have adopted the Prototype Act.26
Because of the unique combination of tax benefits with limited lia-
bility, limited liability companies are likely to become the organi-
zational form of choice for many closely held businesses. Professor
Larry E. Ribstein, the Reporter for the ABA Prototype Act, ob-
tion, 53 MONT. L. REV. 3 (1993) [hereinafter Bahls, Montana's New BCA]. In 1993, in addi-
tion to enacting the Montana Limited Liability Company Act, the legislature, for the first
time in approximately 50 years, restated the Montana Uniform Partnership Act. The re-
statement of the Act adds certainty to partnership transactions and clarifies ambiguity in
the existing law. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (1993); see also Steven C. Bahls,
Important Changes in the Uniform Partnership Act Take Effect October 1, 18 MONT. LAW.
7 (May 1993).
25. PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT (American Bar Ass'n 1992) [hereinaf-
ter ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT]. The Montana Limited Liability Company Act is
patterned after the ABA Prototype Act. The Montana Limited Liability Subcommittee,
however, drafted several significant additions and modifications to the ABA Prototype Act,
all of which were enacted into law. Modifications include both conforming the ABA Proto-
type Act to Montana practice and making substantive modifications. Most of the substan-
tive modifications were designed to protect creditors and the public from certain irresponsi-
ble conduct of limited liability companies. Those protections include:
(1) Annual reports. The Montana Limited Liability Company Act requires limited lia-
bility companies to file annual reports. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-208. The members of the
subcommittee believed that because the limited liability company statute provides owners
of limited liability companies with protection from liability for the debts of the organization,
it is desirable to provide the public with some basic information about each limited liability
company.
(2) Unknown claims against dissolved limited liability companies. The statutory provi-
sions protecting creditors of dissolved limited liability companies are quite strong under the
Montana Limited Liability Company Act. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-909. Subsection (1)
makes it clear that the dissolution of a limited liability company does not negatively impact
creditors' rights. Subsection (2) codifies the common law trust fund doctrine. The trust fund
doctrine provides that the property of a dissolved business is considered a trust fund for the
payment of business debts. 16A WILLIAM FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8161, at 517 (rev. perm. ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993); see Joseph J.
Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors upon Dissolution: Nature
and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate Assets, 30 Bus. LAW. 1061
(1975). As a result, members of a limited liability company receive assets upon dissolution
subject to the claims of creditors. Subsection (3) codifies the holding in North Am. Asbestos
Corp. v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 877 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the dissolution
rules of the state in which the claim arises apply to creditors' claims, not the laws of the
business's state of organization).
(3) Professional limited liability companies. Subject to certain limitations, profession-
als may organize as limited liability companies. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-1301 to -1307
(1993). At least one-half of the managers of professional limited liability companies must be
qualified professionals. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-1303 (1993). Individuals who render profes-
sional services are "liable for any negligent or wrongful act or omission in which the individ-
ual personally participates to the same degree as if the individual had rendered the services
as a sole practitioner." MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-1306(1) (1993).
26. See 1993 Ark. Acts 1003; IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601 to -672 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-8-101.
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serves that over time, "the partnership form of business will
greatly diminish in importance. '27 He goes so far as to predict that
"[a]fter a transitional period, partnership will survive, if at all, as a
residual form for firms that have no customized agreement."2 s Pro-
fessor Richard Parker, of the University of Baltimore School of
Law, agrees when he states: "It is difficult to conceive of a reason
why any business that in the past would have adopted a general
partnership form will not in the future use an LLC. ' '29
B. The Entity Selection Dilemma
Most partnerships and close corporations share the attributes
of substantially similar ownership and management. In businesses
organized as partnerships, all partners usually participate in man-
agement.30 In close corporations, most shareholders commonly
serve both on the board of directors and as officers.3" The substan-
tial similarity of ownership and management in closely held firms
results in several related attributes. The owners/managers of
closely held businesses usually have a keen interest in the identity
of the other owners/managers. As a result, in the family-owned,
closely held business, owners/managers typically restrict ownership
of equity interests to family members. Closely held corporations
also commonly restrict the ability to convey equity interests and
related management rights without the approval of all or substan-
tially all of the other members.
Because ownership and management are nearly identical in
most closely held businesses, closely held businesses tend to oper-
ate more informally than their publicly owned counterparts. Often,
management of closely owned firms does not make major decisions
until a consensus develops. The laws governing partnerships3 2 and
27. Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Part-
nership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417 (1992).
28. Id.
29. Richard L. Parker, Corporate Benefits Without Corporate Taxation: Limited Lia-
bility Company and Limited Partnership Solutions to the Choice of Entity Dilemma, 29
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 399, 469 (1992).
30. As a general rule, partners have equal rights in management. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 401(f) (1992). Montana codified this section at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-401(6)
(1993).
31. Close corporations are corporations in which ownership and management are "sub-
stantially identical to the extent that it is unrealistic to believe that the judgment of the
directors will be independent of that of the stockholders." Symposium, The Close Corpora-
tion, 52 Nw. U. L. REV. 345, 345 (1957). A key characteristic of a close corporation is that it
is not publicly owned, and, therefore, no market exists for its stock. Id. at 345-47.
32. The Uniform Partnership Act permits partners in partnerships at will to dissolve
the partnership upon a partner's express will. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801(1). Montana
codified this section at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-624(1), (2)(b) (1993).
19941
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statutory close corporations 3 encourage consensus building, be-
cause owners are able to dissolve the businesses easily if they disa-
gree with management decisions. Experience shows that closely
held corporations often ignore the statutorily required corporate
formalities of properly electing directors and officers. " Even if di-
rectors are properly elected, close corporations often do not call
required annual meetings and do not properly authorize corporate
actions.3 5 Owners of closely owned businesses often regard the for-
mality required by business organization statutes as unnecessary
red tape or as "Mickey Mouse" requirements imposed by the
government.
Closely held businesses, because they are typically dominated
by one owner or only a handful of owners, often dissolve when the
dominant owner withdraws from the business by virtue of retire-
ment, death or other change in circumstance. Unlike publicly
owned corporations, closely held businesses do not have perpetual
life.
Partnership law adequately reflects the realities of closely held
firms. The Uniform Partnership Act provides for management by
members," restrictions on the transferability of interests,37 and
dissolution upon the death or retirement of an owner.3 The Mon-
tana Business Corporation Act, like that of other state corporate
statutes, fails to provide for the realities of closely owned busi-
nesses. 39 Despite the 1991 amendments to the Montana Business
Corporation Act intended to aid closely held corporations by elimi-
nating needless formalities and allowing additional flexibility in
corporate governance, 0 the law governing corporations continues
the attributes of continuity of life, 1 centralized management, 2 and
33. The American Bar Association Model Statutory Close Corporation Act contains a
provision that allows close corporations to permit any shareholder to cause dissolution of
the corporation at the shareholder's will. Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement, 4
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED 1848-50, at § 33 (Prentice Hall Info. Servs.
ed., Supp. 1993) [hereinafter Model Statutory Close Corp. Supp.]. Montana codified this
provision of the Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-
9-404.
34. Bahls & Compton Quist, supra note 24, at 81.
35. Bahls & Compton Quist, supra note 24, at 81.
36. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(f). Montana codified this section at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-10-401(6).
37. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 501 (1992). Montana codified this section at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-10-508 (1993).
38. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 601 (1992). Montana codified this section at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-10-616 (1993).
39. Bahls & Compton Quist, supra note 24, at 68-85.
40. Bahls, Montana's New BCA, supra note 24, at 4-6.
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-115 (1993).
[Vol. 55
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free transferability of interest.4 s
Though the rigid business governance provisions of state cor-
porate statutes create incentives for closely held businesses to op-
erate under the more flexible partnership statutes, the provisions
of the partnership statutes regarding the rights of creditors dis-
courage closely held businesses from forming as partnerships. Cor-
porate statutes protect shareholders from individual liability to
creditors," while partnership statutes provide that partners are
jointly liable for partnership debts.45 Because of the appeal of lim-
ited liability, the owners of many closely held businesses choose to
operate as corporations. In making this choice, the owners/manag-
ers of these businesses are forced to suffer the disadvantages of
perpetual life, centralization of management, and free transferabil-
ity of interest. Though closely held corporations can take steps to
mitigate these disadvantages, forcing closely held businesses to sat-
isfy the requirements of the Model Business Corporation Act is
like trying to force a square peg into a round hole."
Federal tax laws compound the entity-selection dilemma for
closely owned businesses. Corporations, as a general rule, are re-
garded as separate taxable entities, while partnerships are not. A
corporation is taxed once at the corporate tax level, and sharehold-
ers must pay tax on distributions. As a result, corporations often
suffer from double taxation. Partnership net income, however, is
passed through to its owners, avoiding the double taxation im-
posed on a corporation and its shareholders. The Internal Revenue
Service, through its regulations, has described the attributes of a
business taxed as a corporation.47 Because partnership tax status
of limited liability companies is so important, four primary attrib-
utes of an association taxable as a corporation are central to the
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-416 (1993).
43. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-618 (1993).
44. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-534 (1993).
45. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306 (1992). Montana codified this section at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-10-307 (1993).
46. The comparison between closely held businesses and state corporation laws was
first noted in J.B. Wolens, A Round Peg-A Square Hole: The Close Corporation and the
Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 811 (1968). The Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement, enacted
in Montana, was designed to mitigate many of the disadvantages of corporations for closely
held businesses. See Bahls & Compton Quist, supra note 24, at 85-103. Owners of Montana
statutory close corporations are permitted to structure the business so that it is dissolvable
at will and managed by the owners. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-301 to -302, -404. In
addition, stock in Montana statutory close corporations is not freely transferable. MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-201 to -208. Statutory close corporations, while possessing the state law
aspects of partnerships, are still generally subject to taxation as corporations. See Keatinge
et a., supra note 4, at 382-83.
47. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 to -3 (1993).
1994]
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structure of limited liability companies: (1) continuity of life, (2)
centralization of management, (3) limited liability, and (4) free
transferability of interest. 8 If the organization lacks two of the
four corporate characteristics, the Internal Revenue Code classifies
the business as a partnership.49 Though owners of most closely
held businesses prefer to avoid corporate taxation, many business
owners find that corporate limited liability outweighs the tax ad-
vantages of partnership classification. As a compromise, many
businesses incorporate, but elect to be taxed as S corporations."
Corporations electing taxation under Subchapter S of the Internal
Revenue Code are taxed as pass-through entities. 1 Unfortunately,
in order to qualify as an S corporation, a corporation may not have
more than thirty-five shareholders.52 Similarly, the corporation
may not have owners who are nonresident aliens.53 S corporations
may not be members of affiliated groups and may not have more
than one class of stock.5" Likewise, in some situations S corpora-
tions face significant tax disadvantages when compared to partner-
ships. The disadvantages include taxation of certain in-kind distri-
butions, the inability to adjust the inside basis, and taxation of
some contributions to the business.5
C. Limited Liability Companies as a Solution to the Entity-
Selection Dilemma
Limited liability companies offer an innovative resolution to
the closely held business entity-selection dilemma. Limited liabil-
ity companies, if properly structured, enjoy the business govern-
48. Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-2 to -3 (1993); see also Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296
U.S. 344, 359 (1935).
49. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1993).
50. See supra note 29, at 420.
51. See I.R.C. § 1361-78 (West 1993).
52. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (West 1993).
53. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A), (C) (West 1993). This limitation poses significant barriers
for Canadian-American joint ventures.
54. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D), (b)(2) (West 1993). The restrictions limit estate planning
options. With S corporations, it is impossible to create two classes of stock having different
management and dividend rights for parent and child. The restrictions also cause problems
when investors contribute different types of assets or have different investment expecta-
tions. For example, with S corporations, it is impossible to create one class of stock paying
fixed high dividends and another class of stock paying low dividends but enjoying capital
appreciation. See Parker, supra note 29, at 421 n.103.
55. See Parker, supra note 29, at 422-28. Professor Parker describes these disadvan-
tages in detail and concludes: "Beyond the fact that subchapter S may not be available to or
practical for every business, it should be noted that taxation under subchapter S may, in
certain situations, be significantly greater than the taxation that would have been imposed
had a partnership been utilized." Parker, supra note 29, at 422.
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ance aspects of partnerships (for example, limitations upon trans-
ferability of interest, management by owners, and limited life), the
pass-through tax benefits of partnerships, and the limited liability
attributes of corporations. State statutes provide the business gov-
ernance and limited liability benefits, while a series of revenue rul-
ings confirm that properly structured limited liability companies
will enjoy pass through tax benefits.56
According to Revenue Ruling 88-76," for a limited liability
company to qualify for partnership tax status, a limited liability
company must comply with applicable Treasury Regulation re-
quirements defining partnership attributes.58 As a result, a limited
liability company must lack at least two of the four corporate char-
acteristics.59 Because corporate limited liability characteristics will
always exist in a limited liability company, a limited liability com-
pany must relinquish at least two of the three remaining corporate
characteristics: continuity of life, centralized management, or free
transferability of interests. Limited liability company statutes typ-
ically provide for lack of continuity of life,60 lack of centralized
management,6 and substantial restrictions on the transferability
of interests.6 2 Acts such as the ABA Prototype Act, however, are
sufficiently flexible to allow owners to tailor the organization to
meet their own needs. For example, a limited liability company, by
so providing in its articles of organization, may provide centralized
management by a board of managers.6 Likewise, the operating
agreement or articles of organization may alter the statutory
scheme of limited transferability of interest." Altering the statu-
tory scheme, however, risks jeopardizing the pass-through tax
treatment of limited liability companies.6 5
56. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
57. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
58. Id., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1993); see also Morrisey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S.
344, 357-58 (1935).
59. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1993).
60. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 802. Montana codified this section
at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-802.
61. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 401. Montana codified this section
at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-401.
62. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 704, 706, 801. Montana codified
these sections at Montana at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-704, -706, -801.
63. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 401. Montana codified this section
at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-401.
64. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. AT § 704. Montana codified this section
at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-704.
65. A few states, including Montana, permit one-member limited liability companies.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-201. One member limited liability companies are not likely to be
taxed as partnerships. The definition of partnership is a "syndicate, group, pool, joint yen-
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III. APPLICABILITY OF COMMON-LAW EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF
LIMITED LIABILITY
Limited liability company legislation provides that owners and
managers of limited liability companies are not liable, solely by vir-
tue of being an owner or manager, for the debts of the limited lia-
bility company, whether the debts arise from contract or tort."
The statutory protection from liability for members of limited lia-
bility companies is nearly identical to the statutory protection
from liability for corporate shareholders.6 7 This feature distin-
guishes limited liability companies from partnerships.
The limited liability of members should not be absolute, just
as the limited liability of corporate shareholders is not absolute.
Several of the major exceptions to the rules of limited liability are
created by common law. This Article next examines the historical
and policy justifications both for corporate limited liability and for
the exceptions to corporate limited liability. Examination of these
justifications demonstrates that several of the exceptions to the
limited liability rule should apply to limited liability companies.
A. Historical and Policy Justifications for the Rule of Limited
Liability
American law governing corporate limited liability bears many
attributes of a love-hate relationship. In the 1800s, Jeffersonian
Thomas Cooper described limited liability as a "mode of swindling,
quite common and honorable in these United States" and "a fraud
on the honest and confiding part of the public."6 8 Early in this cen-
tury, President Butler of Columbia University stated a different
perspective: "[T]he limited liability corporation is the greatest sin-
gle discovery of modern times [and that] even steam and electric-
ity are far less important than the limited liability corporation, and
they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it."69
ture, or other unincorporated organization." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (West 1993). The Treasury
Regulations specifically state that a partnership generally terminates when the business is
carried on by only one partner. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(i) (1993). The requirement of
two members is the "very essence of a partnership." Keatinge et al., supra note 4, at 430. As
a result, it is unlikely one-person limited liability companies will receive the benefits of
partnership tax treatment.
66. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 306. Montana codified this section at MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-8-304 (1993).
67. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-304 with MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-534.
68. THOMAS COOPER, LECTURES ON THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 247, 250 (2d
ed. 1830), quoted in HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, 50
(1991).
69. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATE
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Until the early to mid-1800s, legislation in both England and the
United States did not allow just anyone to incorporate and enjoy
the benefits of limited liability for owners.70 Prior to that time, cor-
porations, as a general rule, could be created only by a special act
of Parliament or a state legislature. 71 Those state legislatures en-
acting general corporation statutes usually did so with substantial
limitations on corporations. These limitations included minimum
paid-in capital requirements, limited permissible purposes, and
limited duration.72 These limitations mandated by state legisla-
tures are most likely a result of legislative suspicions about author-
izing a separate legal entity with the attribute of limited liability of
owners. As corporations become a more accepted feature of the ec-
onomic landscape, legislatures have, by statute, removed many
limitations on the ability of corporations to operate. 73
To fully appreciate the statutory and legislative exceptions to
the rule of limited liability, one must appreciate the reasons for
granting limited liability to owners of businesses. Legislatures
grant limited liability to owners of corporations in order to facili-
tate business formation in their states. As early as the 1800s, Jack-
sonian liberals made persuasive arguments that a state's failure to
grant limited liability to corporate owners would drive capital to
other states.74 Similar arguments are still made to legislatures to-
day to encourage legislatures to enact limited liability company
legislation. 75
PROBLEMS 2-3 (1927), quoted in PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-5.
70. See Kenneth K. Luce, Trends in Modern Corporation Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REV. 1291, 1293-94 (1952); see also Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Develop-
ment of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 208-09 (1985).
71. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 12, at 24-25 (3d
ed. 1983).
72. Id. at 25-26.
73. Id. at 26-32.
74. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 68, at 50.
75. In Montana, for example, the Chair of the Limited Liability Company Subcommit-
tee of the State Bar made the following argument to the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees:
It is imperative to note that of the approximately one-third of the states with LLC
legislation in effect, four of the states are in the Rocky Mountain region of the
United States: Wyoming (1977), Colorado (1991), Nevada (1991), and Utah (1991).
Wyoming advertises that its LLC statute provides a tremendous benefit to those
doing business in Wyoming. Montana business deserves the same opportunity and
advantage afforded to business in the neighboring states. To remain competitive,
Montana should provide this opportunity immediately. Not only will LLCs pro-
vide an exciting alternative to more conventional forms of business organizations
in our state, but legislation will facilitate a welcome improvement in Montana's
business image. LLCs are proeconomic development, at virtually no cost. And as
Montana strives to be a leader, not a follower in providing for small business, it
makes great sense that Montana seize this opportunity now.
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Aside from the political necessity of affording owners of busi-
nesses with some form of limited liability, economic necessity may
also exist. Following the Industrial Revolution, capital-intensive
business required increasing amounts of capital. In addition, the
Industrial Revolution created a demand for workers with more
specialized skills. Often workers with the necessary specialized
skills could not accumulate the capital necessary to operate a post-
Industrial Revolution business. 6 As a result, those contributing
the capital necessary to operate the business were not necessarily
those with the specialized skills necessary to operate the business.
Granting limited liability to those who contributed capital en-
couraged investment, because investors could invest without risk-
ing their full net worth. While investors are often willing to risk
their entire net worth to businesses they operate, investors, absent
limited liability, are not willing to invest in businesses that they do
not operate or closely monitor. With limited liability, owners are
free to invest in diverse enterprises without the need of incurring
the excessive costs necessary to monitor each enterprise closely. 7"
Granting limited liability to owners of businesses results in
some risk shifting.78 If a creditor suffers a loss (including a loss
occasioned by a corporation's tortious conduct), the creditor has
little practical recourse against an insolvent corporation. Contract
and tort obligations that would have been the responsibility of the
owners of the business prior to the advent of limited liability are,
after the advent of limited liability, absorbed by the creditors.
While business creditors have always accepted some risk of loss,
the limited liability of owners magnifies that risk. As a result, cred-
itors now have an incentive to learn about the financial where-
withal of a corporation before dealing with it. Creditors also have
incentive to minimize loss by requiring the personal guarantees of
owners that the corporation will adequately perform. Significantly,
however, creditors of a corporation who are creditors by virtue of
the corporation's tortious conduct do not usually have the opportu-
nity to investigate the corporation's finances or obtain a personal
guarantee of owners prior to incurring the loss.7 9
Montana Limited Liability Act: Hearings on SB 146 Before Judiciary Committee of Mon-
tana State Senate, 53d Leg., Regular Sess. (1993) (statement of Steven C. Bahls, at 7).
76. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 68, at 49-55.
77. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW 41 (1991).
78. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 379-80 (3d ed.
1986); see also Ribstein, supra note 27, at 438-50.
79. See generally POSNER, supra note 78, at 380; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 77, at 58-59.
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To illustrate how limited liability shifts risk, assume that a
truck owned by ABC Transport Corporation fails to stop at a red
light and injures a pedestrian. The pedestrian, absent obtaining in-
surance, has no way to mitigate the risk. Because the injured pe-
destrian did not choose to deal with the corporation, the pedes-
trian may not mitigate the risk by investigating the corporation's
financial wherewithal or by bargaining with the shareholders for an
agreement to indemnify. Limited liability shifts the risk of the ac-
cident, if ABC Transport Corporation is insolvent, from the owners
to the injured pedestrian. Although the pedestrian is an innocent
victim and the shareholders are not the primary culpable parties,
one could argue that it is more equitable for the shareholders to
bear the loss. Because the shareholders benefit from the past or
future earnings of the business, an argument might be made that
the shareholders bear the loss, even if those losses were unantici-
pated. In addition, shareholders of the corporation are usually in a
better position to influence corporate management to act in a way
to prevent tortious conduct. Legislatures and courts have fash-
ioned exceptions to the rules of limited liability that shift at least a
part of the risk of corporate misconduct from corporate creditors
back to corporate shareholders.8 0
Some commentators have persuasively argued that less justifi-
cation exists for limited liability of owners in closely held busi-
nesses.81 The primary justification for limited liability of owners is
that limited liability is necessary for capital accumulation when
ownership and management are separate. Ownership and manage-
ment are nearly identical in most close corporations. As a result,
limited liability of owners is often not necessary to encourage in-
vestment in closely held businesses. Owners/managers of these
businesses are more likely to invest, without the benefit of limited
liability, when they participate in control. Courts, recognizing the
lesser need to protect shareholders of closely held corporations
from liability, have applied the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil almost exclusively to closely held corporations.
8 2
80. See infra text accompanying notes 90-142.
81. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1882 (1991) (arguing that the "most familiar ineffi-
ciency created by limited liability is the incentive it provides shareholder to direct the
[closely held] corporation to spend too little on precautions to avoid accidents"); Paul Hal-
pern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO
L.J. 117, 148 (1980) (arguing that in the case of close corporations, "a limited liability regime
will, in many cases, create incentives for owners to exploit a moral hazard and transfer un-
compensated business risk to creditors, thus inducing costly attempts by creditors to reduce
these risks").
82. See generally F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS
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Other arguments, however, may support limited liability in
close corporations. A state's failure to grant limited liability to
close corporations would surely drain investment capital to neigh-
boring states. 83 Limited liability for owners of close corporations
(at the margin) may encourage owners/managers to start a desira-
ble business that is somewhat risky, but not so excessively risky as
to be socially unacceptable. Further, though management and own-
ership are frequently identical in closely held corporations, rela-
tives, retired managers, and others owning equity interests, but not
management stakes, in the corporation, are not uncommon. Lim-
ited liability may be necessary to encourage these investments.
State statutes and common law have, perhaps unartfully, at-
tempted to strike a balance between encouraging entrepreneurs to
take the risks necessary to conduct business and avoid socially un-
acceptable excessive risks. The ABA Prototype Act, for example,
codifies for creditors of limited liability companies many of the
protections creditors of corporations enjoy. As with corporate
shareholders, members of limited liability companies are obligated
to contribute cash equal to the value of the contributions that
members promise to make, but have not made. 4 Limited liability
company creditors may enforce obligations of members to make
promised contributions, but only if the creditors have extended
credit or otherwise acted in reliance on the members' promise.8
The ABA Prototype Act also codifies the trust fund doctrine.86
The trust fund doctrine states that creditors of a dissolved limited
liability company may enforce their claims against former mem-
bers to the extent the company's assets have been distributed to
those members. 7 In effect, members hold the assets in trust for
both known and unknown claimants of the limited liability
company.
In addition to the statutory provisions curbing limited liability
of corporate shareholders, the courts have developed other restric-
tions. Among the most significant restrictions that should apply to
limited liability companies are doctrines governing managerial lia-
bility8 8 and piercing the corporate veil.89
§ 1.10, at 1-46 (3d ed. 1992).
83. See supra note 75.
84. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 502. Montana codified this section at MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-8-502 (1993).
85. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 502(E).
86. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 908(D)(2). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-909(2)(b) (1993).
87. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 908(D).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 90-96.
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B. Application of Corporate Doctrines Governing Managerial
Liability to Limited Liability Companies
Courts should not protect members and managers of limited
liability companies from liability for the torts in which they per-
sonally participate. Agency law clearly establishes that agents are
not protected from liability when they commit tortious acts in the
course of their agency.90 The rule's obvious purpose is to discour-
age irresponsible conduct on the agent's part. Failure to adopt
such a rule allows an agent to hide behind the principal, so that a
victim of the wrongful conduct is deprived of compensation if the
principal is insolvent. These agency principles have been extended
to corporations. Corporate shareholders who commit tortious acts
as agents of the corporation are liable for the consequences of their
actions. 1 Imposing personal liability on managers of businesses
minimizes the risk of those managers engaging in socially unac-
ceptable risk taking. To the extent that socially unacceptable risk
taking is discouraged by tort law, managers of corporations, partic-
ularly inadequately capitalized corporations, are given an incentive
to refrain from activities that expose them to personal liability.
As a general rule, courts should hold members who act as
managers of limited liability companies responsible for their indi-
vidual tortious activities. Agency principles should apply, because
members who act as managers are agents of the limited liability
companies.2 The American Bar Association, in its Commentary to
the ABA Prototype Act, adopts this approach:
This section is not intended to relieve a member from liability
arising out of his own acts or omissions to the extent such acts or
omissions would be actionable, either in contract or in tort,
against the member if he were acting in his individual capac-
ity .... A member also may become liable in tort for claims
against the limited liability company as a result of his negligence
in appointing, supervising, or participating in the activity in ques-
tion with a manager, employee, agent or other member of the lim-
ited liability company. Accordingly, with respect to his liability
for the debts and obligations of the limited liability company, a
89. See infra text accompanying notes 97-142.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1957) ("An agent who does an act other-
wise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the command of the
principal or on account of the principal.").
91. In Montana, cases such as Little v. Grizzly Manufacturing, 195 Mont. 419, 423-24,
636 P.2d 839, 841-42 (1981), clarify that shareholders, officers, or directors who participate
in the negligent actions are not protected from individual liability.
92. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAa. Co. ACT § 301. Montana codified this section
at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-301 (1993).
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member is analogous to a limited partner or a stockholder."
The analysis set forth in the ABA Commentary has been adopted
as part of the Montana Comments. " The analysis is similar to ex-
isting case law applicable to Montana corporations. Cases such as
Little v. Grizzly Manufacturing clarify that neither shareholders
nor directors of corporations are protected from liability for their
own negligent actions.9 5 Little v. Grizzly Manufacturing dealt with
the alleged negligent design and construction of a home." Apply-
ing the facts of Little v. Grizzly Manufacturing to a limited liabil-
ity company, for example, assume a construction company organ-
ized as a limited liability company. Further assume that a member
of the limited liability company negligently designed and con-
structed a building. The limited liability company itself and the
member who participated in the design or construction would be
liable for the negligence. But just as corporate shareholders or of-
ficers who did not participate in the design or construction would
not be responsible for the damages, similarly situated members of
the limited liability company should not be responsible.
C. Application of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil
to Limited Liability Companies
A more difficult common-law doctrine to apply to limited lia-
bility companies is the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Be-
cause virtually all limited liability companies are closely held, the
classic justification for limited liability (necessity of limited liabil-
ity of owners to facilitate the accumulation of capital) does not
strictly apply. As a result, application of the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil, thereby creating an exception to limited liabil-
ity, may be justified.
Many commentators have reserved judgment as to whether
courts should apply the corporate standards for piercing the corpo-
rate veil to limited liability companies.97 Others have argued the
corporate standards for piercing the corporate veil should apply,
seemingly without modification."e One state has gone so far as to
93. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 306 commentary at 25. Montana codified
this section at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-304.
94. LIMITED LIAB. Co. SuBcOMMIrrEE OF THE STATE BAR OF MONT., COMMENTS TO THE
MONTANA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 23, at 10 (1993) [hereinafter COMMENTS TO THE
MONTANA LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT].
95. Little, 195 Mont. at 424, 636 P.2d at 842.
96. Id. at 420, 636 P.2d at 840.
97. See Liability Pt. 1, supra note 4, at 53-54; Hamill, supra note 4, at 744.
98. See Gazur & Goff, supra note 4, at 402-03; Keatinge et al., supra note 4, at 445;
Joseph P. Fonfara & Corey R. McCool, Comment, The Wyoming Limited Liability Corn-
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mandate that courts apply the corporate doctrine to limited liabil-
ity companies. "" The failure of most states to address this issue
statutorily does not mean that legislatures intend that courts not
pierce a limited liability company's veil in appropriate cases.100 In
fact, the doctrine of piercing the limited liability veil of a business
is typically left to common law.
Courts are willing to disregard or pierce the corporate veil if
circumstances make it equitable to do so.101 Professors F. Hodge
O'Neal and Robert Thompson observed that the appropriateness
of piercing the corporate veil may be one of the most frequently
litigated issues in corporate law.102 Despite the frequency of pierc-
ing the corporate veil cases, rules and rationales for piercing the
corporate veil have been called "vague and illusory" and a "legal
quagmire."10 3 Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fis-
chel have observed that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
"like lightning ... is rare, severe, and unprincipled. '" 104 They note
that the doctrine is among the most confusing in corporate law.105
Likewise, the Montana Supreme Court has noted that "[blecause
the remedy is equitable, no concrete formula exists under which a
court will disregard the separate identity of the corporate
entity."'' 0
The doctrine becomes even more confusing when applied to
limited liability companies because the classic tests for piercing the
corporate veil assume business organizations should have decen-
tralized management. Frederick Powell promulgated the classic
test for piercing the corporate veil.' 0 7 Powell suggests that courts
should pierce the corporate veil when: (1) the corporation is an
pany: A Viable Alternative to the S Corporation and the Limited Partnership?, 23 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 523, 525 n.12 (1988).
99. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-107 (Supp. 1991). Section 7-80-107 states:
In any case in which a party seeks to hold the members of a limited liability com-
pany personally responsible for the alleged improper actions of the limited liabil-
ity company, the court shall apply the case law which interprets the conditions
and circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced
under Colorado law.
100. See, e.g., COMMENTS TO THE MONTANA LTD. LiAB Co. ACT, supra note 94, at 1.
101. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 82, § 1.10, at 1-46 to -48.
102. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 82, at 1-46.
103. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-7; see also Henry W. Ballantine, Separate
Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAL. L. REV. 12, 15 (1925).
104. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corpora-
tion, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89 (1985).
105. Easterbrook and Fischel correctly observe that "[a]rbitrariness of these nominal
tests [for piercing the corporate veil] implies lack of basis or function." EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 77, at 55.
106. Hando v. PPG Indust., Inc., 236 Mont. 493, 498, 771 P.2d 956, 960 (1989).
107. FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 3, at 4-6 (1931).
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"instrumentality ... adjunct, creature, pawn, puppet [or] alter ego
of the owners"; (2) the corporation's actions are fraudulent or
wrongful; and (3) the complainant suffers an unjust loss or in-
jury.'08 Powell's classic test is similar to the test adopted by the
Montana Supreme Court. In Montana, courts will pierce the corpo-
rate veil if: (1) the corporation is a mere agent or alter ego of its
owners and (2) failure to do so will result in the corporation de-
feating public convenience, justifying wrong, perpetrating fraud, or
defending a crime."0 9
The problem with applying the corporate test for piercing the
corporate veil to limited liability companies is that corporate gov-
ernance statutes, unlike limited liability company statutes, provide
for centralized management by mandating management by a board
of directors instead of management by owners."' By statute, lim-
ited liability companies are usually managed by members."' Like-
wise, as a general rule, members are generally agents of a limited
liability company for the purpose of conducting its affairs.1"2 As a
result, one could argue that the first test for piercing the corporate
veil (mere agency, instrumentality, or alter ego) is usually satisfied
for limited liability companies. When examining whether the mere
agency, instrumentality, or alter ego relationship exists between
owners and the corporation, courts often examine whether the
owners of the corporation act as managers, making all corporate
decisions."1 When shareholders disregard the corporate formali-
ties, courts are more likely to pierce the corporate veil." 4 Limited
liability company members and managers are not, however, obli-
gated to follow corporate-type formalities.
In determining whether to pierce the limited liability company
veil on the basis of mere instrumentality, alter ego, or agency,
courts should not consider whether members disregard corporate
108. Id.
109. See Drilcon, Inc. v. Roil Energy Corp., 230 Mont. 166, 174-75, 749 P.2d 1058,
1063 (1988); E.C.A. Envtl. Management Servs., Inc. v. Toenyes, 208 Mont. 336, 346-47, 679
P.2d 213, 219 (1984); Flemmer v. Ming, 190 Mont. 403, 409, 621 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1981).
110. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-416(2) (1993).
111. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 401. Montana codified this sec-
tion at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-401 (1993).
112. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(A) ("every member is an
agent of the limited liability company for the purpose of its business and affairs"). Montana
codified this section at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-301.
113. See, e.g., Meridian Minerals Co. v. Nicor Minerals, Inc., 228 Mont. 274, 282-85,
742 P.2d 456, 461-63 (1987) (examining two factors: whether the shareholder is a director or
president and whether the shareholder makes corporate decisions without consulting other
directors).
114. See Jody J. Brewster, Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Montana, 44
MONT. L. REV. 91, 98 (1983).
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formalities. Instead courts should examine whether members disre-
gard limited liability company formalities. In Montana, the Com-
ments of the Limited Liability Company Subcommittee state:
The failure of a limited liability company to observe the formali-
ties customarily followed by business corporations or require-
ments relating to the exercise of its powers or management of its
business and affairs is not a ground for courts disregarding the
separate entity status of [a limited liability company] or for im-
posing personal liability on the members for liabilities of the lim-
ited liability company. Courts should not pierce the limited liabil-
ity company "veil" merely as a result of failure to follow normal
formalities required of a corporation.115
While the formalities required of limited liability companies bear
some resemblance to the formalities required of corporations, sig-
nificant differences exist. " ' As a result, when analyzing whether a
limited liability company veil ought to be pierced, the court should
focus on whether the limited liability company is an alter ego or
mere instrumentality of the members, not on whether the organi-
zation is an agent of its members. Focusing on agency is inappro-
priate because the limited liability company statutes contemplate
that members exercise the same control over the business of lim-
ited liability companies that principals typically exercise over
agents. " 7 In determining whether the limited liability company is
a mere alter ego or instrumentality of its members, courts should
consider several factors, no one of which is to be determinative.
The courts should examine the totality of these circumstances:
(1) Whether the members fail to comply with the formalities
required by the limited liability company statutes. These formali-
ties typically include maintaining a registered agent, " ' acting only
within its business purpose,1 9 maintaining required books and
115. COMMENTS TO THE MONTANA LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT, supra note 94, at 1.
116. The primary difference is that limited liability companies need not be managed
by a centralized board. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-401.
117. The relationship between member/managers and the limited liability company is
much like the relationship between partners and a partnership. Sell observes that the rela-
tionship between "partner and a partnership" is unique only insofar as the partner is both
an agent and one of the principals whenever the partner acts in the partnership's business.
W. EDWARD SELL, AGENCY § 22, at 18 (1975). Likewise, because member/managers of limited
liability companies both control the management of and carry out tasks for limited liability
companies, member/managers are, in one sense, both agents and principals.
118. See,"e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 105. Montana codified this sec-
tion at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-105 (1993).
119. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 106. Montana codified this sec-
tion at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-106 (1993).
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records, ' ° making only those distributions statutorily permitted by
statute, ' and filing required annual reports.122
(2) Whether one member manages the limited liability com-
pany without consultation with other members.1 23
(3) Whether the members and managers failed to keep busi-
ness funds and accounts separate from the funds and accounts of
members. Just as a corporation must keep accounts separate from
its shareholders,1 2 4 a limited liability company is a separate legal
entity and should do the same.1 25
(4) Whether the members fail to keep their personal books
and financial accounts and records separate from the books and
financial accounts and records of limited liability companies, as re-
quired by state statute. 2 '
(5) Whether the limited liability company was originally
grossly undercapitalized to meet the reasonably anticipated capital
requirements, as determined at the date of organization of the
business.1 27
(6) Whether the members of the limited liability companies
fail to hold the business out as a separate legal entity.12 1 Statutes
120. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. Lra. Co. ACT § 405. Montana codified this sec-
tion at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-405 (1993). These provisions require limited liability com-
panies to keep lists of members and managers, organizational documents, operating agree-
ments, and records of initial capital and tax returns. Failure of a limited liability company
to keep required records is not enough alone to justify piercing the limited liability company
veil. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 405(D).
121. See, e.g., ABA LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 604. Montana codified this section at MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-8-604 (1993). These provisions prohibit distributions if the distributions
would render the limited liability company insolvent under the cash flow or balance sheet
tests.
122. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-208 (1993).
123. The ABA Prototype Ltd. Liab. Co. Act provides that if the limited liability com-
pany is managed by members, "the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of more than one-
half by number of the members . . . [is] required to decide any matter connected with the
partnership business." ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 403. Montana codified this
section at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-403 (1993).
124. Meridian Minerals Co. v. Nicor Minerals, Inc., 228 Mont. 274, 280, 742 P.2d 456,
462 (1987); State v. Holdren, 143 Mont. 103, 105, 387 P.2d 446, 447 (1963); Shaffer v. Bux-
baum, 137 Mont. 397, 399, 352 P.2d 83, 84 (1960); Wilson v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 116 Mont.
424, 432, 154 P.2d 265, 269 (1944); Scott v. Prescott, 69 Mont. 540, 553, 223 P. 490, 494
(1924); Hansen Sheep Co. v. Farmers' & Traders' State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 333, 163 P.
1151, 1153 (1917); State v. Hall, 45 Mont. 498, 506, 125 P. 639, 643 (1912).
125. See, e.g., COMMENTS TO THE MONTANA LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT, supra note 94, at 1.
126. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LiAR. Co. ACT § 404. Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-404 (1993).
127. Inadequate capitalization is a factor long considered by courts in cases consider-
ing piercing the corporate veil. See, e.g., Meridian Minerals Co., 228 Mont. at 281-82, 742
P.2d at 462; E.C.A. Envtl. Management Servs., Inc. v. Toenyes, 208 Mont. 336, 348, 679 P.2d
213, 219 (1984).
128. For corporations, courts have long recognized that a corporation may be an alter
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governing limited liability company generally require that the
members of limited liability companies hold their businesses out as
limited liability companies by using the proper designation in the
name of the businesses. 2 9
(7) If the articles of organization require management by man-
agers, whether the members make corporate decisions, thereby
usurping the power of the managers. If those organizing the lim-
ited liability company choose to separate management and owner-
ship, limited liability company statutes require such separation to
be respected. 3 °
(8) If the limited liability company is owned by another busi-
ness entity, whether the managers of the limited liability company
consist of directors, officers, or managers of the other entity.' s '
(9) Whether the members of the limited liability company oth-
erwise fail to respect the separate legal entity of the limited liabil-
ity company. Evidence of failure to do so might include using the
limited liability company's credit to secure loans to members, dis-
tributing earnings to members through means other than author-
ized distributions, or members using limited liability company
property as if it were their own.'
Just as proof of alter ego or mere instrumentality status alone
is insufficient to make a case for piercing the corporate veil,' 3 such
proof alone should not be enough for piercing the limited liability
company veil. In addition, a successful plaintiff must demonstrate
that disregard of the corporate existence is "necessary to prevent
fraud or to achieve equity."'' 34 Because of the difficulties in proving
fraud, most plaintiffs will argue that piercing the corporate veil is
ego of its owner where an owner admits to third parties that the corporation and the owner
are one and the same. Meridian Minerals Co., 228 Mont. at 284, 742 P.2d at 463; see also
Flemmer v. Ming, 190 Mont. 403, 409, 621 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1980); Hansen Sheep Co., 53
Mont. at 333, 163 P. at 1153.
129. The ABA Prototype Act provides that the words "limited liability company" or
"liability company" or the abbreviations "L.L.C." "L.C. " "LLC," or "LC" must be used in
the business's name. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 103. Montana codified this sec-
tion at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-103 (1993).
130. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 301(B), 401(B). Montana codi-
fied these sections at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-301(2), -401(2).
131. This standard is similar to the standard courts use when piercing the corporate
veil in parent/subsidiary corporations. See Hando v. PPG Indus., Inc., 236 Mont. 493, 498,
771 P.2d 956, 961 (1989); Meridian Minerals Co., 228 Mont. at 284, 742 P.2d at 463; Flem-
mer, 190 Mont. at 408-09, 621 P.2d at 1042; State ex rel. Monarch Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes,
113 Mont. 303, 307-08, 124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942).
132. See Brewster, supra note 114, at 93.
133. See Brewster, supra note 114, at 93.
134. See Brewster, supra note 114, at 93. Courts do not require plaintiffs to prove
fraud to satisfy this standard. See E.C.A. Envtl. Management Servs., Inc., 208 Mont. at 347,
679 P.2d at 219.
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necessary to achieve equity. For instance, piercing may be neces-
sary to achieve equity if the limited liability company is grossly
undercapitalized at the time of formation. Though the statutes
governing limited liability companies do not specify an amount of
minimum capitalization,1 3 creditors and others dealing with lim-
ited liability companies do not expect limited liability companies
to be grossly undercapitalized at the date of formation. If members
deliberately or recklessly capitalize a limited liability company so
inadequately that they likely violate the reasonable expectations of
those dealing with the business, courts should pierce the limited
liability company veil.13 Inadequately capitalized firms are likely
to engage in unacceptably risky activities.3 7 Additionally, in the
absence an effective mechanism to pierce the veil of undercapital-
ized firms, owners will engage in such risky activities because they
have little to lose. As a result, it is equitable for courts to pierce
the veil in such instances.
In addition to gross undercapitalization, courts should pierce
the limited liability veil to achieve equity where actual fraud oc-
curs; 38 the limited liability company assets have been stripped so
as to avoid payment to creditors; 39 the limited liability company
has misrepresented itself to be a form of business organization
where owners are individually liable;'" the limited liability com-
pany has been formed with the intent of avoiding contractual lia-
bility;" or the limited liability company has been formed to cir-
cumvent regulatory statutes or common-law duties. " 2 Of course,
because the doctrine of piercing the veil is equitable in nature, it is
not possible to list all events where piercing is necessary to prevent
inequity.
Many of the policies justifying piercing of corporate veils also
justify piercing limited liability company veils. As noted, however,
courts facing the issue of piercing the limited liability company veil
should look to corporate law for guidance, but fashion rules appro-
priate for the unique attributes of limited liability companies.
135. The capital contribution provisions of limited liability company statutes are usu-
ally silent as to the amount of capitalization. See, e.g., ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT
§ 501. Montana codified this section at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-501 (1993).
136. The importance of inadequate capitalization to the issue of piercing the corporate
veil is noted in PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1.05[2].
137. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 77, at 59.
138. Brewster, supra note 114, at 97.
139. POWELL, supra note 107, § 13(c). Stripping corporate assets from a limited liabil-
ity company typically violates the governing statute. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-604.
140. POWELL, supra note 107, § 13(d).
141. Brewster, supra note 114, at 98-99.
142. Brewster, supra note 114, at 101-02.
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IV. APPLICATION OF COMMON-LAW CORPORATE DOCTRINES TO THE
DUTIES OF MEMBERS AND MANAGERS
The common law establishes different duties of conduct for
partners in partnerships than for the managers in corporations.
Courts, attorneys, and the business community need guidance as to
which, if either, standard is most applicable to limited liability
companies. Courts should refrain from stating that either the cor-
porate or partnership standard always applies because limited lia-
bility companies uniquely combine features from both partner-
ships and corporations.
Limited liability companies generally lack the corporate attri-
bute of centralized management. Unless otherwise specified in the
articles of organization, management of limited liability companies
rests with the members. 4 ' If members of a limited liability com-
pany so desire, they may provide for centralized management by
including authorization to do so in the articles of organization.' If
limited liability companies are not member-managed, the manag-
ers of the limited liability company serve in a position analogous to
corporate directors and officers. The managers are elected and re-
moved by the members.1 5 A majority vote of the managers is
needed to make decisions." 6 If the articles of organization provide
for managers, managers act as agents of the limited liability com-
pany for the purpose of conducting its business. 47 The statutes
governing limited liability companies, as such, borrow from both
the partnership scheme of one member, one vote and from the cor-
porate scheme of permitting managers who may, or may not, be
owners. After examining partnership and corporate duties, clearly
the duties of members of limited liability companies should be a
hybrid of those found in partnership and corporate law.
143. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 401(A). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-401(1) (1993).
144. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 401(B). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-401(2) (1993).
145. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 401(B). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-401(2).
146. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 401(B). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-401(2).
147. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(B). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-301(2) (1993).
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A. Duties of Owners and Managers Mandated by Partnership
and Corporate Law
1. Duties of Conduct Applicable to Partnerships
Historically, courts have considered partners as fiduciaries of
each other.' " As a result, partners' duties inter se are quite strict.
In the oft-quoted case of Meinhard v. Salmon,14 9 Judge Cardozo
described his view of partners' duties:
[C]opartners, owe to one another ... the duty of the finest loy-
alty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fi-
duciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbinding and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undi-
vided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular excep-
tions. . . . Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not
consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.' 50
Justice Cardozo's mandate that partners act with the "punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive," while poetic, fails to provide concrete
and needed guidance to partners. The Cardozo formulation fails to
describe with specificity the obligations created as a result of the
fiduciary duty. What sort of dealings are impermissible as conflicts
of interest? What if a partner makes a misjudgment in a manage-
ment decision, but has acted in good faith in doing so? Is it realis-
tic to expect partners, whose primary objective in entering into the
partnership is often some sort of personal gain, to act with the
"punctilio of an honor the most sensitive?" Professor Hillman
observes:
Rather than attempting to force partners to conform to a stan-
dard that is neither realistic nor desirable, emphasis should be
placed on developing predictable and systematic standards to de-
fine unacceptable pursuit of private advantage within partner-
ships. Existing standards are impossible to define, arbitrary in ap-
148. Leona Beane, The Fiduciary Relationship of a Partner, 5 J. CORP. L. 483, 483
(1980).
149. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
150. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 563 (citation omitted). Judge Cardozo's reasoning and rule
have been adopted by the Montana Supreme Court in Murphy v. Redland, 178 Mont. 296,
308-09, 583 P.2d 1049, 1056 (1978); see also Bradbury v. Nagelhus, 132 Mont. 417, 428-29,
319 P.2d 503, 509 (1957).
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plication, ineffective in the achievement of their stated goals, and
premature in their canonization of participants in partnerships. 151
To address the problems associated with defining the general
standards of partners' conduct among themselves, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in its 1992
version of the Uniform Partnership Act, suggested that state stat-
utes provide that the "only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the
partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the
duty of care."' 52 According to the new Uniform Partnership Act,
partners must discharge the duties of loyalty and care in good
faith.'53 The duty of loyalty obligates the partner to: (a) account to
the partnership for property, profit, or benefit the partner derives
from the partnership business; (b) refrain from dealing with the
partnership on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the
partnership; and, (c) refrain from competing with the partner-
ship." The partners' duty of care is limited to acting in a manner
that does not constitute gross negligence. 55
When examining whether the partnership law governing the
duties of owners should apply to limited liability companies, courts
should examine the modern partnership duties, while avoiding the
generalities of the Cardozo formation. Managers and members of
limited liability companies, because it is a new form of business
entity, need more than generalities to guide their conduct.
2. Duties of Conduct Applicable to Corporations
Corporate law also has been evolving in recent years in its def-
inition of duties of corporate directors, officers, and controlling
shareholders. Legislatures and courts have found three basic duties
of corporate owners and managers in closely held corporations: (1)
the duty of care; (2) the duty of loyalty; and (3) the duty to avoid
illegal, oppressive, and fraudulent conduct.'56
The duty of care for directors requires that directors and of-
ficers act "(a) in good faith; (b) with the care an ordinarily prudent
151. Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV.
425, 471 (1987).
152. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(a). Montana codified this section at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-10-405 (1993).
153. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(a). Montana codified this section at MONT. CODE.
ANN. § 35-10-405.
154. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(b). Montana codified this section at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-10-405(2).
155. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(d). Montana codified this section at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-10-405(4).
156. Bahls, Montana's New BCA, supra note 24, at 6-32.
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person in a similar position would exercise under similar circum-
stances; and (c) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation. ' 157 A judicial gloss called
the business judgment rule has been applied to the duty of care.158
The best statement of the business judgment rule is found in the
American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance:
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in
good faith fulfills the duty under this Section if the director or
officer:
(1) is not interested . . . in the subject of his business
judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of his business
judgment to the extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate
under the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that his business judgment is in the
best interests of the corporation.5 9
The business judgment rule is designed to encourage directors to
take the risks that entrepreneurs should take. If directors are sub-
jected to liability with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, directors will
be unduly restrained in their decision making. The business judg-
ment rule creates a rebuttable presumption that directors acted in
good faith and on an informed basis.160 Courts interpret the busi-
ness judgment rule to provide that judgments by directors, if made
in good faith, are protected when the directors were informed and
not grossly negligent."1 Directors' actions are grossly negligent if
the actions are taken without reason, in deliberate disregard of the
interests of the business, or with reckless indifference to the busi-
ness's interests.1 6 2
Corporate law also holds officers and directors to a duty of loy-
alty. Though not as lofty as the duty of loyalty applicable to part-
157. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 8.30(a), 8.42(a) (1991). Montana codified these
sections at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-418(1) to -443(1) (1993).
158. Bahls, Montana's New BCA, supra note 24, at 10.
159. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 4.01(c), at 181-82 (American Law Inst. Proposed Final Draft 1992) [hereinafter ALI PRIN-
CIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
160. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)); see also ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 4.01
cmt., at 188:
Courts, when applying the business judgment rule, have often stated that a 'pre-
sumption' exists in favor of the propriety or regularity of the actions of the direc-
tors and officers. This correctly signifies than no inference of dereliction of duty
can or should be drawn from the fact, for example, that a corporation has suffered
a business reversal.
161. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
162. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 970 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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nerships described by Judge Cardozo, the classic statement of the
duty of loyalty of officers and directors is still quite high. In the
Delaware case of Guth v. Loft, Inc., the duty of loyalty required
"an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation" and no
conflict with the officers' and directors' self-interests. 163 The semi-
nal close corporation case, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,1 4
provides for a similar duty for close corporations. The court, in
Donahue, proscribes a duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty." '65
Though the court in Guth properly acknowledged that the duty of
loyalty cannot be subjected to a "hard-and-fast rule" or a "fixed
scale",'66 the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance describe several "subduties" of the duty of loyalty: (1) the
duty not to profit individually and unduly from transactions with
the corporation;' 7 (2) the duty to refrain from receiving excessive
compensation;' 8 (3) the duty to use corporate property, material,
nonpublic corporate information, and corporate .position only for
the benefit of the corporation;' 69 (4) the duty to not appropriate
corporate opportunities;' 70 and (5) the duty to refrain from com-
peting with the corporation.'
The final corporate duty, not clearly found in partnership law,
is the duty of controlling shareholders and directors to avoid ille-
gal, oppressive, and fraudulent conduct.'7 2 If the duty is violated,
courts are permitted by common law,' 73 and in some states by stat-
ute,7 4 to apply a broad array of equitable remedies. These reme-
dies include ordering a dissolution of the corporation; ordering the
corporation or a shareholder to purchase the shares of the op-
pressed shareholder; partitioning the property of the corporation;
ordering payment of a dividend; and ordering appointment of spe-
163. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch. 1939).
164. 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975). The court noted that controlling shareholders
"may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty
to the other stockholders and to the corporation." Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515. The Dona-
hue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. case was recently cited with approval by the Montana Supreme
Court. See Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 246 Mont. 125, 137, 804 P.2d 359, 366
(1990).
165. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
166. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
167. ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, §§ 5.02, 5.07.
168. Id. § 5.03.
169. Id. § 5.04.
170. Id. § 5.05.
171. Id. § 5.06.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 226-72.
173. Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate
Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 294-312 (1990).
174. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-939 (1993).
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cial fiscal agents, receivers, or provisional directors to assist with
the operation of the corporation.17
Courts appropriately apply these equitable remedies when
they find oppression in closely held corporations. Owners of closely
held corporations do not have a public market for their stock. If
the directors or controlling shareholders violate their reasonable
expectations, courts will intervene to protect these expectations.
Courts usually measure violations of the duty to avoid oppression
by whether the reasonable expectations of shareholders are
protected. 176
When fashioning standards against which to test the conduct
of members and managers of limited liability companies, courts
should consider each of the three corporate duties described.
Courts should fashion clear standards against which to test the
duty of care, duty of loyalty, and duty to avoid oppression. Courts
should not, however, blindly adopt the corporate standards, be-
cause many of the attributes of corporations are not shared by lim-
ited liability companies. 77
B. Duties of Conduct Applicable to Limited Liability
Companies
1. Policy Considerations
Comparatively little has been written about the range of du-
ties of members and managers of limited liability companies. 78
175. See Bahls, supra note 173, at 294-312.
176. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 82, § 9.30; Donald F. Clifford Jr., Close
Corporation Shareholder Reasonable Expectations: The Larger Context, 22 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 41 (1987); Robert W. Hillman, Indissoluble Partnerships, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 691
(1985); Sandra K. Miller, Should the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority Share-
holders Exclude a Consideration of Ethical Conduct and Business Purpose?, 97 DICK. L.
REV. 227 (1993); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasona-
ble Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193 (1988); see also Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443
(Alaska 1985); Maschmeier v. Southside Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988);
Sawyer v. Curt & Co., 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 117 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1991); Pedro v.
Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645
P.2d 929 (1982); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., Inc., 400 A.2d 554 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 414 A.2d 995 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980), cert. denied, 425 A.2d
273 (N.J. 1980); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App.
1986); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984); Meiselman v. Meiselman,
307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987); Gee v. Blue
Stone Heights Hunting Club, Inc., 604 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); Masinter v.
WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980).
177. See infra text accompanying notes 200-72.
178. One group of commentators, however, suggests that "the rule for LLCs probably
will evolve toward general partnership-type duties for members in member-managed LLCs,
and toward corporate director-type duties for managers in manager-managed LLCs." See
30
Montana Law Review, Vol. 55 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/3
CORPORATE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE
States addressing the duties by statute have taken different and
incomplete approaches. 17 9 No state has enacted comprehensive leg-
islation defining all of the duties that owners and managers of lim-
ited liability companies typically owe each other. When developing
standards against which to test the duties of limited liability com-
pany members and managers, courts and legislatures should con-
sider the theoretical underpinnings justifying the imposition of du-
ties in both partnership and corporate law. Courts should examine
whether these underpinnings justify application of corporate or
partnership duties to limited liability companies.
Common-law duties of managers and owners of closely held
businesses are needed for both equitable and efficient distributions
of wealth. It seems equitable that managers, who act in socially
unacceptable ways or who take excessive and unacceptable en-
trepreneurial risks, personally bear the costs of those risks. Owners
of closely held businesses, however, often invest with their co-own-
ers to diversify their risk. Assume, for example, that one co-owner
takes an entrepreneurial risk of increasing production of a firm's
product by ten percent. Assume further the increase in production
causes a loss because sales do not increase by ten percent. If the
judgment to increase production was reasonable at the time the
decision was made, other co-owners might reasonably expect to
share in the risk associated with increasing production. By sharing
these reasonable risks, owners effectively diversify their risk.
Rules governing duties in limited liability companies should
encourage acceptable entrepreneurial risk taking, but deter exces-
sive and unacceptable entrepreneurial risk taking. °80 Of course, dif-
ferentiating between acceptable and unacceptable excessive risk
taking is difficult. While owners of businesses might bargain or
contract for which specific entrepreneurial risks are acceptable and
for which are not, most owners of businesses do not bargain about
each entrepreneurial risk assumed. 181 As such, the fiduciary duties
of corporate law and agency law fill gaps in incomplete bargains
about entrepreneurial risk.182 The duty of care fills gaps in bar-
Keatinge et al., supra note 4, at 401.
179. See generally James W. Lovely, Agency Costs, Liquidity, and the Limited Lia-
bility Company as an Alternative to the Close Corporation, 21 STETSON L. REV. 377, 411-14
(1992).
180. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 77, at 98-100.
181. One commentator recently noted: "Viewed contractually, the typical closely held
corporation is mostly gaps." Charles R. O'Kelly, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation
Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 216, 216 (1992). O'Kelly accu-
rately notes that most closely held firms do not have agreements in place as to how to
respond to most future contingencies. Id.
182. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 77, at 92-93.
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gains involving the degree of skill used in decision making, while
the duty of loyalty fills gaps in bargains relating to conflict-of-in-
terest transactions.
Courts should also consider efficiency when fashioning the
common-law duties of owners and managers. Rules fashioned by
courts should maximize the owners' wealth. Judicial intervention is
an expensive way to encourage responsible entrepreneurial risk
taking. If lower cost ways exist to provide incentives for responsi-
ble risk taking, then courts should exercise restraint in involving
themselves in entrepreneurial decision making.
When analyzing the legal structure and resulting economic im-
plications of limited liability companies, in some ways, the struc-
ture encourages acceptable entrepreneurial risk taking, but in
other ways fails to encourage acceptable entrepreneurial risk tak-
ing. The attributes of decentralized management, limited life, and
lack of free transferability of interest create conflicting incentives
for managers to assume only acceptable risks.
Because of the incentives federal tax law, provides to avoid
centralized management (and thereby gain from partnership tax
treatment), the members will likely manage the business in most
limited liability companies. Unlike the relative ease with which
shareholders may remove corporate directors, members of limited
liability companies may not as easily remove member/managers of
limited liability companies. Corporate shareholders may remove
directors by failing to re-elect them at the end of their term or by
removing them by shareholder vote in the middle of their term.183
In limited liability companies, unless otherwise provided in the ar-
ticles of organization, the right to participate in management is a
right that cannot be taken away from a member."" Limited liabil-
ity company statutes go so far as to provide that members retain
their management rights even after their membership, interest is
assigned.185 While members are permitted to remove another mem-
ber, they are only permitted to do so if authorized by the articles
of organization or the operating agreement.1"' Laws governing the
management rights of members in limited liability companies are
quite similar to the rules in the Uniform Partnership Act.187 Be-
183. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.08; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-424(3).
184. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 401(A). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-401(1).
185. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 704(A). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-704(1) (1993).
186. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 802(A)(3). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-802(1)(c) (1993).
187. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 301(1) (each partner is an agent of the partner-
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cause of the difficulty in removing members, members are less able
to minimize their risks by removing a member/manager who takes
unacceptable entrepreneurial risks. One could argue that the level
of duty should be sufficiently higher to encourage difficult-to-re-
move members to act reasonably.
Though members in limited liability companies have difficulty
removing members with whom they are dissatisfied, they are able
to easily withdraw from a limited liability company by giving
thirty days' written notice. Since limited liability companies do not
possess the perpetual existence of corporations, initially the mem-
ber's ability to withdraw easily from a limited liability company 88
may suggest that less need exists for courts to scrutinize whether
one member has breached a duty to another. An unhappy member
of a limited liability company has the practical remedy of with-
drawing and receiving the value of that member's interest. Further
analysis reveals that although limited liability company statutes
permit members to withdraw, the statutes create financial incen-
tives not to withdraw before the end of the term of existence of the
limited liability company. Statutes provide that if members of lim-
ited liability companies withdraw before the end of the limited lia-
bility company's term of existence, they have breached either the
articles of organization or the operating agreement.18 9 The limited
liability company may recover damages from the member commit-
ting the breach. 9 ° As with the law governing management rights,
the scheme governing members who withdraw from limited liabil-
ity companies is similar to laws governing partners who withdraw
from a partnership. 91 Even if the limited liability company is an
"at-will" limited liability company, members have financial incen-
tives not to withdraw. Withdrawal often causes liquidation. When
assets are liquidated under "fire sale" conditions, all owners will
absorb the losses connected with the sale of the business assets at
depressed sale prices. As a result, the ability to leave a limited lia-
bility company and receive fair market value for one's interest may
be more illusory than real.
ship); see also UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(0 (each partner has equal rights in manage-
ment) and § 601(4) (expulsion of a partner requires unanimous vote). Montana codified
these sections at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-10-301(1), -401(6), -616(4) (1993).
188. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 802(C). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-802(3) (1993).
189. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 802(C). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-802(3).
190. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAa. Co. ACT § 802(C). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-802(3)(a).
191. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 801, 802, 808. Montana codified these sections at
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-10-624, -625, -629 (1993).
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Courts must also consider that decentralized management in
both partnerships and limited liability companies results in more
bargaining about acceptable entrepreneurial risks. To the extent
that member/managers of limited liability companies are more
likely to bargain about entrepreneurial risks, less need exists for
judicial intervention to fill gaps in incomplete contracts governing
these risks. Owners in closely held businesses (as compared to
stockholders of publicly held corporations) are active in the man-
agement of the business. Owners typically have greater access to
information and a greater ability to use that information to man-
age the corporation properly. Because owners of closely held busi-
nesses often put a great deal of their net worth into the business,
they typically do not diversify their investments among several
businesses.1 92 Member/managers of closely held businesses have an
incentive to avoid excessive risk taking, because they personally
bear a greater proportion of the costs of their misjudgments than
managers of publicly held corporations. 93 Because member/man-
agers of closely held businesses are dealing in their own assets,
courts might consider a lower standard of care. "'
Though limited liability companies are more similar to part-
nerships in management structure, one must ask what impact, if
any, limited liability should have on the duties of members and
managers. One might argue that the duties in a partnership should
be higher than in a corporation or limited liability company, be-
cause the misjudgments or misdeeds of a partner might expose
other partners to unlimited personal liability. Higher duties might
create an incentive to partners to avoid taking risks exposing their
copartners to such liability.
Finally, courts should consider the lack of a public market for
shares in closely held businesses when defining the level of duties.
A public market creates significant and powerful incentives for
managers to manage corporations in a way that maximizes profits
and owners' returns. 195 A public market for stock allows dissatis-
fied shareholders to sell their shares. Sales of a significant number
of shares depress stock prices, making way for new owners (some-
times corporate raiders) to buy stock and oust incompetent incum-
bent management. Similarly, the management of publicly held cor-
porations is more carefully monitored by persons outside the
corporation, including independent directors, accountants, and in-
192. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 77, at 237.
193. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 77, at 243-44.
194. See infra text accompanying notes 204-09.
195. POSNER, supra note 78, at 383.
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vestment bankers. As a result, the market creates incentives for
managers to align their interests with the interests of sharehold-
ers.196 These market incentives are lacking for most limited liabil-
ity companies. One could argue that because market incentives are
lacking, courts should supply other incentives to managers in the
form of stricter fiduciary duties.
Because of the dissimilarities of limited liability companies
with any one other form of business organization, courts should
adopt on a wholesale basis neither partnership duties nor duties
applying to close corporations. The difference between limited lia-
bility companies and other forms of business organizations creates
conflicting arguments for stricter or less strict standards.19 The in-
ability of members to remove member/managers and the lack of
public market for ownership interests would dictate stricter duties
for member/managers of limited liability companies. The attrib-
utes of decentralized management and limited liability would seem
to dictate lesser duties. As a result, courts should not promulgate a
general rule adopting either corporate or partnership duties. In-
stead, courts should analyze each specific duty and develop sepa-
rate standards for members and managers of limited liability com-
panies. These separate standards ought to borrow from existing
corporate and partnership standards only when appropriate.19"
This Article provides some guidelines from which courts might de-
velop more precise statements of duties for members and managers
of limited liability companies. 99
2. Application of the Duty of Care to Limited Liability Compa-
nies
Limited liability company statutes do not address, in a com-
prehensive fashion, the duties members owe to one another inter
se. The ABA Prototype Act, for example, addresses the issue but
does not state an affirmative duty of care.200 Instead, it provides
196. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 77, at 232-33.
197. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 77 at 243-44 (Easterbrook and Fischel simi-
larly have noted that the differences between closely held and publicly owned corporations
"do not suggest unambiguously that the level of scrutiny should vary or, if it does, in which
direction").
198. Claire M. Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts: Fi-
duciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111, 156
(1993). Further compounding the problem is that both corporate duties and partnership
duties are evolving and are not capable of precise definition. Id. at 157.
199. See infra text accompanying notes 200-72.
200. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 402. Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-402 (1993).
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for a limitation on the common-law duty of care between business
owners. The ABA Prototype Act states:
A member or manager shall not be liable, responsible or account-
able in damages or otherwise to the limited liability company or
to the members of the limited liability company for any action
taken or failure to act on behalf of the limited liability company
unless such act or omission constitutes gross negligence or willful
misconduct.2 1
Because it provides only a limitation on the duties, the ABA Pro-
totype Act leaves the courts to define the precise duty of care. 20 2
The Official Comments to the ABA Prototype Act note that be-
cause of the difference among limited liability companies, "the pre-
cise boundaries of the duty will be left to develop by case law and
operating agreement rather than by statutory provision. 9203
The appropriate test to measure the conduct of those who
manage limited liability companies (whether member/managers or
nonmember/managers) is a corporate-type standard. Courts should
borrow heavily from the American Law Institute Principles of Cor-
porate Governance when fashioning a duty of care. Specifically, a
manager (whether a member or nonmember) of a limited liability
company who makes a business judgment should satisfy the man-
ager's duty of care if:
(a) the manager acted in good faith,0 4
(b) the manager did not have a significant financial or per-
sonal interest in the subject of the manager's business judgment,20 5
(c) the manager was adequately informed with respect to the
judgment to the extent the manager reasonably believed was ap-
propriate under the circumstances, 20 and
(d) the manager rationally believed 20 7 that the business judg-
201. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 402(A). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-402(1).
202. One state, however, has gone so far as to codify a business judgment rule applica-
ble to limited liability companies. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024.1(A) (Michie 1993).
203. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 402, commentary at 30.
204. The good faith standard is borrowed from both partnership law, UNIF. PARTNER-
SHIP ACT § 404(d), and corporate law, ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 4.01(c)
cmt., at 227-28.
205. ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 4.01(c) cmt., at 227-28. If a man-
ager has a financial or personal stake in the transaction, the manager's conduct may violate
the duty of loyalty. For a discussion of the obligation of corporate managers to keep them-
selves informed, see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
206. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73.
207. The words "rationally believe" have a special significance:
The words "rationally believe" direct courts to examine a director's subjective be-
liefs. Not all subjective beliefs, however, are protected from judicial scrutiny. The
word "rationally" establishes a limit on the range of acceptable subjective beliefs.
[Vol. 55
36
Montana Law Review, Vol. 55 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/3
CORPORATE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE
ment was in the best interest of the limited liability company. '
The party attacking the manager's decision as uninformed, irra-
tional, or not made in good faith must rebut the presumption that
the business judgment was informed and not grossly negligent or
reckless. °9
This proposed standard is a business judgment rule, which is,
from a manager's point of view, less strict than a negligence stan-
dard. Statutes such as the ABA Prototype Act adopt critical ele-
ments of the business judgment rule. The ABA Prototype Act pro-
vides that members and managers are not liable for their conduct
unless the act or omission complained of "constitutes gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct." s 0 The comments to the ABA Proto-
type Act make reference to the business judgment rule when they
state: "In general, as long as managers avoid self-interest and
grossly negligent conduct, their actions are protected by the busi-
ness judgment rule. 2 11
The business judgment rule, firmly implanted in corporate
law, is gaining recognition in partnership law. The National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), in
its new Uniform Partnership Act, borrows heavily from the busi-
ness judgment rule. The new Uniform Partnership Act provides
that as long as partners act in good faith,12 they have complied
with their duty of care provided their conduct "does not constitute
gross negligence or willful misconduct. 21 ' s NCCUSL chose to
"leave further development of the rule to the courts."2 4 Courts
considering partners' duties of care have adopted a business judg-
ment rule with increasing frequency."1 5 As a result, whether limited
Those limits are to be determined by an objective standard of what the reasonable
person in a like position might do under similar circumstances.
Bahls, Montana's New BCA, supra note 24, at 11-12.
208. ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 4.01(c) cmt., at 227-28.
209. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984)); see also ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 4.01(c) cmt., at
238.
210. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 402(A).
211. ALl PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 4.01(c) cmt., at 30.
212. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(d). Montana Codified this section at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-10-405 (1993).
213. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 402(A).
214. Id., commentary at 71.
215. See Wyler v. Feuer, 149 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Rosenthal v. Rosen-
thal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988). Although not expressly adopting the business judgment
rule for partnerships, other courts have, consistent with the business judgment rule, held
that partners are not liable for conduct that is merely negligent. See, e.g., Johnson v. Weber,
803 P.2d 939, 941 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); Duffy v. Piazza Constr., Inc., 815 P.2d 267, 268
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
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liability companies are more similar to partnerships than to corpo-
rations, the business judgment rule is appropriate. As a consensus
develops that the business judgment rule is necessary to encourage
the spirit of entrepreneurship in both partnerships and corpora-
tions, it would be appropriate to extend that rule to limited liabil-
ity companies.
The salient attributes of limited liability companies seem to
support a standard less strict than mere negligence. Members of
limited liability companies concerned with the quality of manage-
ment can, albeit at some cost, dissociate themselves from the lim-
ited liability company. In addition, while a stricter rule might be
appropriate for partnerships where personal liability for misactions
of copartnership is unlimited, such a strict rule is not appropriate
for limited liability entities. In fact, many small business owners
co-own a business with another entrepreneur in that line of busi-
ness for the purpose of diversifying their risk. Part of diversifica-
tion of risk is to spread the losses incurred as a result of negligent
actions, including action committed by one business owner, among
all owners. The business judgment rule helps accomplish this
objective.
3. Application of the Duty of Loyalty to Limited Liability
Companies
Courts should apply the modern partnership duty of loyalty to
members and managers of limited liability companies. Most of the
corporate rules relating to the duty of loyalty are too unwieldy for
limited liability companies, because the corporate rules contem-
plate centralized management. Both statutes and common law
describing the duty of loyalty in the corporate context contemplate
approval of conflict-of-interest transactions by the disinterested
members of the board of directors or disinterested shareholders.1 e
Partnership rules governing the duty of loyalty are simpler and
more appropriate for limited liability companies. Like partnership
property, limited liability company property is managed by all
members, creating a special relationship of trust.21 1 Members, like
partners, are all agents of the business. Both members of limited
liability companies and partners, as agents, must account to the
216. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-462 (1993); ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, § 5.02 to .07.
217. See ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 401. Montana codified this section at
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business for profits they individually derive. 18
Limited liability companies are operated informally, making
the complex corporate scheme, which requires formal director or
shareholder approval, unwieldy. Recognizing these realities, the
ABA Prototype Act adopts a duty of loyalty similar to the partner-
ship duty of loyalty:
(b) Every member and manager must account to the limited lia-
bility company and hold as trustee for it any profit or benefit de-
rived by him without the consent of a majority of the disinter-
ested managers or members, or other persons participating in the
management of the business or affairs of the limited liability com-
pany from (1) any transaction connected with the conduct or
winding up of the limited liability company, or (2) any use by him
of its property, including, but not limited to, confidential or pro-
prietary information of the limited liability company or other
matters entrusted to him as a result of his status as manager or
member.219
218. Section 404 states:
A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is lim-
ited to the following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property,
profit or benefit derived by the partner, without the consent of the other partners,
in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or from a use by the
partner of partnership property;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership on behalf of a party having an
interest adverse to the partnership without the consent of the other partners; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership without the consent of the
other partners.
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404. Montana adopted this section at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-
405.
219. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 402(B). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-402. The ABA comments to this section state:
Subsection (B), which is based on UPA § 21, sets forth the duty of loyalty of
LLC managers and managing members--that is, the duty to act without being
subject to an obvious conflict of interest. The more extensive corporate rules on
conflict of interest transactions are unwieldy in the informal context of closely
held LLC's.
The duty of loyalty under this Section is defined to include two major compo-
nents: "Self-dealing," or a manager's reaping an individual profit by or through an
LLC transaction in which the manager participated; and liability for appropriat-
ing for personal use property belonging to the LLC without the firm's consent.
Such appropriation would amount to, in effect, unauthorized compensation. This
duty follows from the simple fact that LLC property is owned by the firm as a
whole rather than by individual managers or members. Note that property is de-
fined to include records of the LLC that are in the manager's control. Because of
the similarity of this section with the UPA, the courts undoubtedly will interpret
it as imposing duties similar to those in the general partnership, including the
duty not to appropriate partnership opportunities.
ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT, § 402(B) commentary at 30.
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Though courts should apply the duty of loyalty found in partner-
ship law to limited liability companies, the subduties of the duty of
loyalty found in corporate law are a helpful starting point for
courts when analyzing the subduties present in the limited liability
company context. These subduties include:
(a) The duty not to "unduly profit individually" or through a
related party from a transaction with the corporation.220
(b) The duty to avoid causing the business to pay oneself ex-
cess compensation.22'
(c) The duty to use business property, business material, non-
public business information, and business position only for the
benefit of the corporation.222
(d) The duty to avoid profiting from business opportunities.22 3
(e) The duty to refrain from competing with the business. 224
Of course, in the limited liability company context, members who
are not managers do not have the managers' duties of loyalty. 225
The duty of loyalty will not always be sufficient to protect
owners of limited liability companies. Certain conduct by the ma-
jority of the members may not strictly violate the duty of loyalty,
but is nonetheless a violation of a member's reasonable expecta-
tions. In these cases in the corporate context, courts have created a
new duty, which is closely related to the duty of loyalty. The new
duty is described in the next section.
4. Application of the Duty to Avoid Illegal, Oppressive, and
Fraudulent Conduct to Limited Liability Companies
The final duty of owners and managers in the closely held bus-
iness context is the duty to avoid illegal, oppressive, and fraudu-
lent conduct. A violation of this duty allows courts to order a num-
ber of equitable remedies, including requiring one party to buy out
the interest of another party or partitioning the property.226 Courts
and legislatures have created this duty, and the corresponding eq-
uitable remedies, to address the special problems of minority
shareholders in closely held corporations.22 7
220. ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, §§ 5.02, 5.07.
221. Id. § 5.03.
222. Id. § 5.04.
223. Id. § 5.05.
224. Id. § 5.06.
225. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 402(C). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 35-8-402(3) (1993).
226. See supra note 176. Broad equitable remedies are expressly permitted by Mon-
tana statute. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-939.
227. See Bahls, supra note 173, at 288-315.
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A typical corporate oppression case involves a family owned
corporation, where the founding parent of the corporation has
died. The second-generation siblings develop divergent goals. One
sibling might become less active in the corporation, looking pri-
marily at the corporation as a steady source of dividends. Another
sibling might stay active in the corporation, desiring a significant
salary but no dividends. If these divergent goals create friction, the
controlling shareholder might "freeze out" the minority share-
holder. Common "freeze out" techniques include restricting the
minority shareholder's access to management, information, divi-
dends, and distributions.
Unlike shareholders in a publicly held corporation who are
able to sell their stock when they wish to disassociate with the bus-
iness, shareholders in a closely held corporation have few alterna-
tives. Realistically, the only buyers are the other shareholders, who
are often the shareholders staging the freeze out. Making matters
worse, the majority shareholders have monopsony power. Monop-
sony power arises when only one buyer exists. Because of this mo-
nopsony power, the majority shareholders will often discount any
purchase price they are willing to pay to lower than market
price.228 Many courts have created a remedy for these shareholders
by finding that minority shareholders have been oppressed when
majority shareholders violate their reasonable expectations.22 9 The
equitable remedies available to shareholders of closely held corpo-
rations are among the more meaningful rights of minority
shareholders.23 °
Though less common among partnerships, partnership law
also recognizes the power of courts to intervene when one partner
oppresses another.2 3' The new Uniform Partnership Act allows a
court, upon application of a partner, to dissolve a partnership if
"another partner has engaged in conduct relating to the partner-
ship business that makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on
the business in partnership with that partner.21 32 Often, when
228. See POSNER, supra note 78, at 291-92.
229. See supra note 176.
230. In Montana, five corporate oppression cases have been decided by the Montana
Supreme Court in the past 12 years: Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 246 Mont.
123, 804 P.2d 359 (1990); Gray v. Harris Land & Cattle Co., 227 Mont. 51, 737 P.2d 475
(1987); Maddox v. Norman, 206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230 (1983); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198
Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982); Skierka v. Skierka Bros., Inc., 192 Mont. 505, 629 P.2d 214
(1981).
231. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801(5). Montana codified this section at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-10-616 (1993).
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courts dissolve partnerships on the grounds of misconduct, courts
are responding to cases where one set of partners violates the rea-
sonable expectations of the other partners.2 33 Professors Bromberg
and Ribstein note that the approach courts take to partner mis-
conduct cases is similar to the approach courts take in corporate
shareholder oppression cases.2 4
No limited liability company statute fully addresses the issue
of whether courts should fashion equitable remedies in the face of
majority oppression of minority members. Because limited liability
companies are relatively new creations, case law has not developed
on this issue. The ABA Prototype Act, however, partially addresses
the issue by permitting courts to decree "dissolution of a limited
liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry
on the business in conformity with the articles of organization or
operating agreement."3 5 The drafters of the ABA Prototype Act
intended the "not reasonably practical" language to include "at
least some of the causes of dissolution provided for in partnership
law, particularly including partner misconduct. 236 When majority
members in limited liability companies commit acts of oppression,
courts should consider dissolving the limited liability companies or
consider ordering other equitable remedies.
Though some state statutes permit courts to dissolve a limited
liability company as a result of events making it not reasonably
practicable to carry on business (presumably including oppres-
233. See, e.g., Ferrick v. Barry, 68 N.E.2d 690, 694-95 (Mass. 1946) ("holding that
even if the court may think that one partner could carry on successfully, if he were allowed
to push aside the others, it ought not to sanction such an alteration in the agreed relations
of the partners"); see also Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Wood v. Holiday Mobile Home Resorts, Inc., 625 P.2d
337 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981); Owen v. Cohen, 119 P.2d 713
(Cal. 1941); Lau v. Wong, 616 P.2d 1031 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980); Tembrina v. Simos, 567
N.E.2d 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Susman v. Venture, 449 N.E.2d 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982);
Ohlendorf v. Feinstein, 636 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Boland v. Daly, 318 A.2d 329
(Pa. 1974).
234. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP § 7.06(c), at 7:63 (1992);
see Robert W. Hillman, Misconduct as a Basis for Excluding or Expelling a Partner: Ef-
fecting Commercial Divorce and Securing Custody of the Business, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 527,
547-51 (1983).
235. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LiAE. Co. ACT § 902. Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-902 (1993).
236. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 902, commentary at 64. The Montana com-
ments are more specific: The comments state that examples of when it might not be reason-
able practice to carry on business are found in the involuntary dissolution provision of part-
nership law. These reasons include "a member has been guilty of such conduct as tends to
affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business" and "a member willfully or persistently
commits a breach of the operating agreement." COMMENTS TO THE MONTANA LTD. LIAa. CO.
ACT, § 47, at 19.
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sion), state statutes do not typically authorize courts to order equi-
table remedies less drastic than dissolution. One might ask, then,
whether courts should and could apply equitable remedies other
than dissolution when courts encounter oppression or other serious
misconduct within a limited liability company. A review of case
law involving the same issue in the corporate context strongly sug-
gests that courts have equitable power, even absent statutory au-
thorization, to fashion broad equitable remedies to address miscon-
duct committed by the owners of a business.3 7 The first recorded
instance 3 8 of a court intervening in a dispute between owners of a
business is the 1828 English case of Hichens v. Congreve.239 After
finding directors had improperly withdrawn funds from the corpo-
ration, the court decided "such a transaction is so incorrect, that it
is quite impossible that any court of justice could permit it to
stand." 40
In the United States, courts have long recognized the equita-
ble powers of courts to intervene in disputes between owners of
businesses.2 ' Courts acting in equity have long fashioned equitable
remedies to protect shareholders' just expectations242 and to pro-
tect against other shareholders to insure that the value of their
stock is not diminished as the result of oppression.4 Similarly,
courts also have applied their broad equitable powers to resolve
disputes in partnerships. In partnerships, the accounting remedy is
a useful, equitable remedy to provide for a statement of the status
of the affairs of the partners. In order to provide appropriate
relief, courts in accounting proceedings,246 or in a separate suit to
declare the rights of partners,246 may order the appropriate injunc-
tion or other ancillary relief. Though many limited liability com-
237. See George D. Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse--Judicial Power to
Wind Up a Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 220
(1940).
238. Id. at 220.
239. 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (1828).
240. Id. at 917-20.
241. Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F.2d 817, 825 (4th
Cir. 1933); Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 746, 751 (N.D. Ohio 1893)
(stating that "new remedies and unprecedented orders are not unwelcome aids to the chan-
cellor to meet the constantly varying demands for equitable relief").
242. 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 447
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. ed., 2d ed. 1886) (stating that aggrieved shareholders can seek
relief in equity).
243. See JOSEPH A. JOYCE, ACTIONS By AND AGAINST CORPORATIONS AT LAW AND IN EQ-
uiTY § 424 (1910).
244. See BROMBERO & RIBSTEIN, supra note 234, § 6.08, at 6:95 to :122.
245. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 234, § 6.08, at 6:118.
246. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 234, § 6.08, at 6:108 to 6:109.
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pany statutes do not expressly provide for an accounting remedy,
courts still have the equitable powers to fully adjudicate the rights
of members in limited liability companies.2"
Although courts have broad equitable powers to intervene in
disputes between business owners, courts should not apply those
remedies as quickly to limited liability companies as they do to
corporations. In many corporate cases, application of equitable
remedies is appropriate because no ready market exists for close
corporation stock, thereby making it impossible for majority share-
holders to realize any value for their shares. 48 Members of limited
liability companies likewise do not have a ready market for their
interest, because members' interests are subject to substantial limi-
tations on assignability.2 49 A member of a limited liability com-
pany, however, may always withdraw from the limited liability
company.2 5 If a member does so in breach of the articles of organi-
zation or operating agreement, however, the limited liability com-
pany is entitled to recover damages against the member for the
breach.25' Upon the member's dissociation, the remaining members
may avoid dissolution by unanimously agreeing to continue the
business. 52 If the other members continue the business, the disso-
ciated member is entitled to receive, within a reasonable amount of
time, the "fair value" of the member's interest. 53 If the other
247. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 1102, commentary at 86. The commentary
states:
LLC members may have other remedies for breach of fiduciary duty. An account-
ing, which reviews and settles all financial matters in a single proceeding, is the
primary mechanism for resolving claims among partners. LLC statutes do not pro-
vide for such a proceeding .... [However,] something like an accounting undoubt-
edly will occur in connection with dissolution and winding up of the firm. Prior to
dissolution, LLC members can obtain full adjudication of related issues without
an accounting under modern pleading and joinder rules. Indeed, it has been held
that such rules make the formal accounting proceeding unnecessary even in
partnerships.
Id.; see Sertich v. Moorman, 783 P.2d 1199 (Ariz. 1987).
248. For a detailed description of the liquidity problem experienced by corporate
shareholders, see Bahls, supra note 173, at 291.
249. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAR. Co. ACT § 704. While an interest in a limited liability
company is assignable in whole or in part, assignment of an interest does not entitle the
assignee to rights other than receiving distributions nor does assignment entitle the assignee
to the right to participate in management or any of the other rights of members. Id. Mon-
tana codified this section at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-704 (1993).
250. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 802(A). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-802 (1993).
251. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 802(C). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-802.
252. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 901(C). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-901 (1993).
253. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 602. Montana codified this section at
[Vol. 55
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members do not agree to continue the business, the members or
managers may wind up the affairs of the business. 54 Upon the
winding up of the affairs of the business and after creditors are
paid, the members are entitled to a return of their contributions
and their share of earnings.2 5
5
As a result of the statutory schemes governing limited liability
companies, members are able, at any time, to force liquidation of
either their interest or the limited liability company, even in lim-
ited liability companies with a specified term of existence. 56 Be-
cause legislatures provide avenues other than judicial actions to
oppressed members of limited liability companies, courts should
not intervene unless the other avenues are substantially inade-
quate. Requiring courts to use their equitable powers to resolve
member dissension creates significant administrative and transac-
tion costs. These costs include attorney fees, court costs, fees for
appraisers and other experts, diverted managerial energy, and the
added burden on the judicial system. When courts do intervene in
corporate cases, a court-ordered purchase of the shares of one
shareholder by the corporation is the most common remedy or-
dered.257 In most limited liability company cases, an oppressed
member need not seek a court order requiring a buyout. The op-
pressed member is entitled by statute to dissociate and create a
liquidation or buyout, without the necessity of a court action.15 8
Courts might still properly intervene in limited liability com-
pany oppression cases in a number of circumstances. One circum-
stance is when an oppressed member's dissociation from the lim-
ited liability company results in a penalty to the dissociated,
oppressed member. In limited liability companies with specified
terms of existence, members causing premature dissolution will
suffer a deduction from the amount they receive upon their disso-
ciation equal to the amount of the damages caused by their disso-
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-602 (1993).
254. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 903(A)(1). If a member or manager has
engaged in "wrongful conduct," upon a showing of cause, the district court may wind up the
business. Id. § 903(A)(2). Montana codified this section at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-903
(1993).
255. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 905(C). Montana codified this section at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-905 (1993).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 249-55.
257. J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Pro-
posed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1,
50-56 (finding a court-ordered buyout in 20 of 37 reported cases from 1984-85).
258. See ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAR. Co. ACT §§ 802, 901, 903. Montana codified these
sections at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-802, -901, -903.
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lution.259 The deduction is known as a premature dissociation pen-
alty. In cases where innocent minority members may suffer a
premature dissociation penalty because dissociation was forced at
the hands of an oppressive majority member, courts should con-
sider ordering a dissolution of the business. If a court orders a dis-
solution, no premature dissociation penalty is applicable.26 0 An or-
der of dissolution may result, however, in a loss of goodwill of the
business if the business is liquidated. If the business is sold at a
judicial sale, buyers of the business are usually unwilling to pay the
full value for the business because of the risks of losing the man-
agement team, of relying on inadequate financial statements, of en-
countering seller competition, or of experiencing material adverse
change in the business before completion of the purchase."' If lim-
ited liability company owners are likely to experience such losses,
courts should consider ordering other, less drastic remedies.
Courts may also appropriately use their equitable powers
when the oppressive conduct of the majority is likely to force the
minority member to dissociate, thereby allowing the majority to
capture control of the business. Consider a three-person limited li-
ability company owned equally by A, B, and C. Assume that the
articles of organization state that the limited liability company will
operate for a five-year period. Assume A and B form an alliance for
the purpose of squeezing out C from participation in the business.
Assume that because of A and B's collective wrongful conduct, C
sees no practical alternative but to withdraw prior to the end of
the five-year period of life. Not only will C suffer a premature
withdrawal penalty, C's interest can also be purchased by the lim-
ited liability company if A and B so desire.262 If C's interest is pur-
chased, A and B have, in effect, gained total ownership of the busi-
ness as a result of their wrongful actions. In cases such as this,
courts might appropriately order a dissolution, thereby allowing A,
B, and C an equal opportunity to buy the assets of the dissolved
business in the winding-up process. If A and B's conduct was op-
pressive and C is best able to operate the business, courts might
consider ordering the limited liability company to purchase A and
259. See ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 802(C). Montana codified this section
at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-802(3).
260. The ABA Prototype Act does not provide for any reduction for damages unless
the dissociation was premature. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 902. Montana codi-
fied this section at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-902.
261. See Bahls, supra note 173, at 331-32.
262. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 903, commentary at 65 ("A 'winding up'
may involve the firm's sale as a going concern to existing members or third parties rather
than liquidation and termination.").
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B's interest.26 Alternatively, courts could use their equitable pow-
ers to order a partition of the limited liability company's prop-
erty.2 " Of course, courts partitioning the limited liability company
must determine that the business can be divided into two commer-
cially viable units and take care to provide for creditors.2 5 Courts
might also order a distribution to members (or to the oppressed
member),266 appoint a receiver,267 remove a manager,'" order a for-
263. In corporate law, courts usually overlook the option of requiring those sharehold-
ers guilty of oppression to sell their stock. More typically the complaining shareholder is the
shareholder bought out. See Bahls, supra note 173, at 299-300. Nonetheless, cases in at least
one other country have allowed, to a limited extent, minority shareholders to purchase the
interest of majority shareholders. See, e.g., Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths, Ltd., 3 All E.R.
57 (Ch. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 3 All E.R. 184 (C.A. 1971). I have suggested courts
consider the following factors in determining whether the majority or minority owners have
the option to purchase interests of the other:
(1) the respective financial situation of the shareholders;
(2) the court's ability to restrain effectively the selling shareholder from.compet-
ing with the purchasing shareholder;
(3) the ability of shareholders to operate the corporation profitably (presumably,
the bigger the profit potential of the corporation the greater the potential
purchase price); and
(4) the ability of the shareholder whose actions were oppressive to pay money
damages to the oppressed shareholder for his loss.
Bahls, supra note 173, at 299-300. The first three of these factors were suggested in Hendley
v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1325-27 (D.S.C. 1987).
264. Courts have acknowledged that they possess the power to partition property in
corporate shareholder dissension cases. See Kay v. Key West Dev. Co., 72 So. 2d 786, 788
(Fla. 1954); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 236 (N.M. Ct. App.
1986).
265. See Bahls, supra note 173, at 306.
266. In response to corporate oppression cases, courts have ordered payment of divi-
dends. See Kisner v. Coffey, 418 So. 2d 58, 60-62 (Miss. 1982) (reversing lower court's hold-
ing "that there be no [payments] of dividends without unanimous consent of the board of
directors"); Muller v. Silverstein, 458 N.Y.S.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Patton v.
Nicholas, 279 S.W.2d 848, 857 (Tex. 1955); see also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668,
681-82 (Mich. 1919) (stating that directors should not arbitrarily withhold the profits earned
by the company and must exercise discretion for the profit of the shareholder); Erdman v.
Yolles, 233 N.W.2d 667, 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that the lower court properly
found that the distribution of profits was a dividend); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d
692, 695 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947) (allowing the judgment of the controlling directors if made in
good faith); cf. Chounis v. Laing, 23 S.E.2d 628, 640 (W. Va. 1942) (ordering the corporation
to pay plaintiff a share of profit "whether represented by dividends, salaries, retained assets
or otherwise").
267. Whitman v. Fuqua, 549 F. Supp. 315, 322 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Burleson v. Hayutin,
273 P.2d 124, 128 (Colo. 1954); Drob v. National Memorial Park, Inc., 41 A.2d 589, 597 (Del.
Ch. 1945); Handlan v. Handlan, 232 S.W.2d 944, 950 (Mo. 1950); Thisted v. Tower Manage-
ment Corp., 147 Mont. 1, 14, 409 P.2d 813, 821 (1966); Imbriale v. Imbriale, 534 N.Y.S.2d
418, 420 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
268. Brown v. North Ventura Rd. Dey. Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)
(stating that "[s]ince directors hold a position of trust, judicial power to remove them exists
independent of statute").
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feiture of unlawful distribution,'" set aside managers' actions,270 or
order an accounting.
271
When selecting the equitable remedy most appropriate to
resolving dissension in limited liability companies, courts should
protect the reasonable expectations of the members, while at the
same time seek to minimize the costs and losses associated with
the remedy. Specifically, when selecting an equitable remedy to re-
solve dissension, courts should measure the remedy against these
standards:
(a) The remedy should maximize the ability of minority mem-
bers to realize their reasonable expectations.
(b) The remedy should minimize the administrative costs as-
sociated with resolving the dissension.
(c) The remedy should maximize the value of the limited lia-
bility company business while allowing members to realize value in
accordance with their reasonable expectations.1
7 1
Members' expectations deserving protection include the right
to a voice in management, a prorated share of profits in the busi-
ness, and the right to be treated as other members are treated.
Courts ordering an equitable remedy because these expectations
are violated should fashion the remedy best protecting these
expectations.
V. CONCLUSION
Authorization of limited liability companies is the most signifi-
cant national development in the law of closely owned business or-
ganizations in decades. Limited liability companies uniquely com-
bine attributes of partnerships and corporations in a way that
makes them very attractive to closely held businesses. The combi-
269. Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 483 N.E.2d 283, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); ABC Trans
Nat'l Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 1299, 1314-15 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980).
270. Whitman, 549 F. Supp. at 324 (enjoining executive committee from circum-
venting the delegated responsibilities of the directors); Katcher v. Ohsman, 97 A.2d 180, 186
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1953) (enjoining holding of special meeting of directors to oust
minority shareholder officers and to grant salaries to majority shareholders to the exclusion
of minority shareholder); Browning v. C & C Plywood Corp., 434 P.2d 339, 343 (Or. 1967)
(stating that the court had the power "to cancel the stock increase and restore the stock-
holders to their former proportionate status"); Bank of Mill Creek v. Elk Horn Coal Corp.,
57 S.E.2d 736, 751 (W. Va. 1950) (setting aside sale of corporate assets because of an inade-
quate price); Lierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 102 S.E. 249, 255 (W. Va. 1920) (set-
ting aside sale of corporate assets because of an inadequate price).
271. See, e.g., Gray v. Hall, 295 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (stating that plain-
tiff is entitled to an accounting of the corporation's books); Segall v. Shore, 215 S.E.2d 895,
899 (S.C. 1975) (ordering an accounting of the affairs of a partnership and a corporation).
272. These standards are adapted from Bahls, supra note 173, at 320.
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nation of selected corporate and partnership attributes creates dif-
ficulties for courts when deciding whether to apply common-law
corporate and partnership doctrines to limited liability companies.
The unique combination of these corporate and common-law doc-
trines makes it inappropriate to apply all corporate common-law
rules or all partnership common-law rules without modification.
This Article suggests that courts should adopt neither all corporate
doctrines nor all partnership doctrines. Instead, where appropriate,
courts should develop new doctrines for limited liability compa-
nies. As courts begin to resolve the uncertainty caused by the open
question of which doctrines to apply, operating limited liability
companies will become more certain. As a result, limited liability
companies will become an even more attractive form of business
organization.
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